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Abstract
Using a static model of firm behaviour with imperfect competition on the product and
labour markets, we quantify the effect of firm heterogeneity in total factor productivity, market
power, capital, wages and prices on the aggregate labour share. In particular, we suggest a
new decomposition of the aggregate labour share in terms of the first moments of the joint
distribution of these variables across firms, providing a bridge between the micro and the
macro approach to functional distribution. We provide an application of our method to the UK
manufacturing sector, using firm-level data for the period 1998-2014. The analysis confirms
that heterogeneity matters: in an economy populated only by representative firms, the labour
share would be 10 percentage points lower. Among all the dimensions studied, heterogeneity
in total factor productivity and labour market power are the most relevant ones, whereas
heterogeneity in product market power matters the least, with wages and prices in between.
However, the observed fall in the aggregate labour share over the period is mostly explained
by a widening of the disconnect between average productivity and real wages, with a smaller
role for an increase in the average product and labour market power of firms after the Great
Recession, while changes in the dispersion of these variables mostly offset each other.
KEYWORDS: labour share, firm heterogeneity, market power, firm level data.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D33, E25, L10, D20, D42, D43.
†Corresponding author. Email: luis.valenzuelarivera@spi.ox.ac.uk.
1
1 Introduction
A marked decrease in the labour share over the recent decades has been documented in many
countries. Updating the data collected by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), the IMF shows
that in advanced economies the labour share decreased from around 75% in the first half of the
1970s to less than 40% in the first half of the 2010s (IMF, 2017). A downward trend, although of
smaller magnitude, is also observed for European countries (Dimova, 2019). There is considerable
debate about the causes underlying the documented decline in the labour share, ranging from
capital-augmenting technological change; a decline in the price of capital relative to labour, capital
accumulation, globalisation, deregulation of product and labour markets, an increase in firms’
product and labour market power, financial deepening, monetary policy, the rise of “superstar
firms”, and even an increase in the cost of housing.
Most studies have adopted either a macro or a representative agent perspective, linking the aggregate
labour share (at the national, regional or industry level) to aggregate values of those determinants,
with a smaller number of studies looking at the determinants of the labour share at the level of the
individual firm, and a few others focusing on compositional issues, that is explaining the decline in
the aggregate labour share with an increase in the relative importance of firms with a lower than
average labour share.
In this paper we propose a different statistical approach, based on a static model of firm behaviour
with CES production functions and imperfect competition in the product and labour markets and
geared towards empirical analysis, where all the determinants of the aggregate labour share can
be jointly studied building up from the micro level, even in absence of an aggregate production
function. This allows us to offer a full characterisation of the aggregate labour share in terms of
the distribution of the individual determinants (in particular, we focus on wages, output prices,
productivity, capital, and market power). The full characterisation can be approximated by a
parsimonious characterisation in terms of the mean, variance and covariance of all those variables.
Hence, we are able to generalise the three approaches described above, provide a quantification of
the overall effect of heterogeneity, and look into the relative importance of the different sources of
heterogeneity.
Our main theoretical result is that when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is
below 1 —the empirically relevant case— an increase in the dispersion of productivity or monopsony
power increases the aggregate labour share, while an increase in the dispersion of real wages or
product market power decreases it. By contrast, in the Cobb-Douglas case, where the elasticity
is equal to 1, only heterogeneity in market power has a direct effect on the labour share, while
heterogeneity in prices, productivity, capital, and wages affects the labour share only if it is
correlated with market power.
Empirically, we show on UK firm-level data that that firm heterogeneity increases the level of
the aggregate labour share by roughly 10 percentage points, with respect to the labour share of a
“representative” firm. This wedge however has remained fairly constant over time: the observed fall
in the aggregate labour share is mainly explained in terms of the fall in the labour share of the
representative firm, particularly due to an increased pay-productivity gap, and to a lesser extent
to increased market power. The contribution of heterogeneity in explaining the change in the
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aggregate labour share is minor and mainly comes from an increased dispersion in TFP and labour
market power.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature.
Section 3 presents a simple model of firm optimisation, where firms have a CES technology with
constant returns to scale, with imperfect competition both in the product and the labour markets,
and derives our theoretical results and main decomposition formula. Section 4 describes the data
and our empirical strategy, while Section 5 describes our main findings. Section 6 summarises and
concludes.
2 Literature
2.1 The determinants of the aggregate labour share
Abstracting from measurement issues, we can divide the existing empirical work on the labour
share in three categories: (i) studies based on aggregate data, at the national, regional or industry
level, where the outcome variable is the aggregate labour share; (ii) studies based on micro data,
either at the firm or at the establishment level, where the outcome variable is the individual-level
labour share, and (iii) studies where the aggregate labour share is analysed as an average of the
individual-level labour shares, for instance by means of a shift-share analysis.1
Analyses of the aggregate labour share typically consider only aggregate variables —that is, totals
or averages— as controls.2 This might sound natural but as our contribution shows, the whole
1The imperfect measurement of capital and labour income is recognised as a potential confounder, although its
importance is debated. Koh et al. (2018) suggest that the observed decline in the labour share is mostly explained by
unaccounted intangible investments in R&D. This is however contrasting with Corrado et al. (2009), who show that a
proper measurement of intangibles would point to a stronger increase in labour productivity, with a correspondingly
stronger decline in the labour share. Elsby et al. (2013) refine the treatment of self-employment income and show
that this slightly reduces the decline in the labour share, in the US. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) consider the
case of using higher depreciation to account for less durable capital such as computers and software, but find similar
trends in gross and net labour share, worldwide.
2A comprehensive review of the papers adopting the macro approach is outside the scope of this work. It is
however interesting to consider what this literature has identified as the main determinants of the fall in the aggregate
labour share. Zeira (1998); Acemoglu (2003); Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018)
point to (capital augmenting) technological change as a main driver, with Autor and Salomons (2018) and Eden and
Gaggl (2018) focusing in particular on the role of automation. Piketty (2014); Piketty and Zucman (2014) and Glover
and Short (2019) stress the role of capital accumulation. Harrison (2002); Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003); Acemoglu
(2003) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) point to the decline in the price of capital relative to labour, while
Hergovich and Merz (2018) and Leo´n-Ledesma and Satchi (2018) stress increased factor substitutability between
capital and labour, and Grossman et al. (2018) bring the attention to a slowdown in productivity. Gonza´lez and
Triv´ın (2017) point to increased asset prices, which lower investment —an explanation which is however at odds with
the emphasis on capital deepening as a driver of the decline in the labour share (see above). Harrison (2002); Lee
and Jayadev (2005); Guscina (2006); Daudey and Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa (2007); Jayadev (2007); IMF (2007) and Elsby
et al. (2013), among others, focus on globalisation and its implications in terms of the balance of power between
capital and labour. Deregulation of product and labour markets, including privatisation policies, de-unionisation
and the decline of employment-protection policies, is emphasised by Bassanini and Duval (2006); Annett (2006);
Bental and Demougin (2010); Stiglitz (2012); Barkai (2016); Ciminelli et al. (2018); Dizon and Lim (2018); Dimova
(2019) and Pak and Schwellnus (2019), among others. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), in an influential theoretical
work, take into account the general equilibrium effects of deregulation policies and show that workers lose from
product market deregulation but gain as consumers, and they eventually gain even from labour market deregulation,
although only in long run, due to lower unemployment. Weil (2017) generically refer to the disempowerment of
labour and the consequential reduction in the labour share, linked to practices such subcontracting, franchising, and
a global supply chain, as financialisation. Furceri et al. (2018) point to financial globalisation and the liberalisation
of international capital flows. Cantore et al. (2018) find an empirical relation between the decrease in the labour
share and monetary policy easing, pointing to a new theoretical puzzle as this is inconsistent with a broad range of
standard models. Rognlie (2015) and Gutierrez Gallardo (2017) point to the increase in the cost of housing and the
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distribution of these variables matters. The aggregate approach is sometimes either explicitly or
implicitly justified with reference to an aggregate production function at the country/industry level.
Our criticism simply reflects the fact that aggregate production functions typically do not exist
(see below). Thus, macro studies generally fall short of establishing causal relationships in the data.
Only when a theoretical model of firm behaviour predicts an unambiguous association between
variables at the micro level, irrespective of other firm’s characteristics, this association can be safely
tested using aggregate data. This is for instance the case of Azmat et al. (2012), where they test the
prediction that privatization is associated with a lower labour share on cross-country industry-level
OECD data.
Studies that analyse composition effects (e.g. Valentinyi and Herrendorf, 2008; Abdih and Danninger,
2017) can offer valuable insights about the dynamics of the aggregate labour share, but are often
more descriptive in nature as they typically do not dig into what caused the shift in the composition
of firms, nor they model firms’ behaviour. For instance, Hopenhayn et al. (2018) point to the
decline in population growth, which reduces firm entry rates and shifts the distribution of firms
towards older firms with a lower labour share, in the US, but they do not offer an explanation why
older firms have a lower labour share.3
Microeconometric studies are more causal in nature, but they generally do not derive implications
for the aggregate labour share, or make the explicit or implicit assumption that what is relevant at
the micro level is also relevant at the macro level, again a sort of aggregate production function
type of argument. Studies that follow this approach include Siegenthaler and Stucki (2015), who
study the determinants of the firm-level labour share on a panel of Swiss firms. They conclude
that the most important factor in driving down the labour share is the diffusion of information and
communication technologies (ICT). The aggregate labour share however remained fairly constant
due to slow technological progress and sectoral reallocation towards industries with above-average
labour share. Perugini et al. (2017) find a negative effect of internationalisation (in terms of export
propensity, offshoring and foreign direct investment) on the firm-level labour share, using balance
sheet data for six EU countries. De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) document a rise in markups
in the US from around 20% in 1980 to around 60% in the mid 2010s, well exceeding the rise in
overhead costs. They link this to the decline in the labour share, mostly to the benefit of profits.
An increase in product market power, coupled with a decline in rent sharing with employees, is also
foud in the UK (Bell et al., 2018).
We also analyse the aggregate labour share as a weighted average of individual-level labour shares,
but we characterise the behaviour of individual firms and map it directly into the aggregate outcome.
Hence, in our analysis it is the joint distribution of firm-level characteristics that matters for the
aggregate labour share, and not only average values. We can therefore explain the dynamics of the
aggregate labour share in terms of changes in the moments of this joint distribution. Our approach
related increase in the value of capital and in real estate profits.
Our framework considers most of those determinants, in terms of their effects on firm-level variables. Technological
change, given an elasticity of substitution between capital and labour smaller than 1, has a negative impact on the
labour share in our model, as well as between-sectors and within-sectors shifts to relatively more capital-intensive
technologies, changes in the relative price of capital with respect to labour (as brought about by a decreasing
bargaining power of workers connected to globalisation and/or a weakening of labour market institutions, e.g. unions,
collective bargaining and other industrial relations, minimum wages, employment protection and unemployment
benefits), increased product and labour market power of firms. Only capital deepening per se, that is an increase in
the K/L ratio at given technologies, has no effects on the labour share, in our model.
3Using macro data, Short and Glover (2017) point to a decreased ability of older workers to extract their marginal
product of labour as a wage.
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thus provides a bridge between the three perspective considered above.
Some theoretical models of firm behaviour take firm heterogeneity into account and have clearcut
implications in terms of the aggregate labour share. This is the case of the theory of superstar
firms (Autor et al., 2017b,a), where the driving force is an increasing “winner takes most” feature
of cont markets, and of the model proposed by Aghion et al. (2019), where the driving force is a
reduction in the cost of spanning multiple markets, leading to the selection of more productive
firms characterised by a lower labour share, with an initial outburst of growth, followed by a
low-innovation, low-growth regime. Consistently with the superstar firms narrative, Kehrig and
Vincent (2017) find that the labour share has increased in most plants, but the reallocation of
production towards hyper-productive, low labour share plants has caused the aggregate labour
share to decline, in the US.
With respect to those papers, our model of firm behaviour is much simpler, as we follow a static,
partial equilibrium approach. On the other hand, we are able to fully characterise and quantify
the impact of the different dimensions of heterogeneity on the aggregate labour share, offering a
comprehensive and novel decomposition method.
A paper closely related to our work is Mertens (2019). He develops a parsimonious theory of firm
behaviour where three factors can affect the firm-level labour share: product market power, labour
market power, and the output elasticity of labour, reflecting the importance of labour in production.
Using German firm-level data, Mertens shows that his framework accounts for 94% of the observed
variation in the labour share in manufacturing, between 1995 and 2014. Product and labour market
power however account for only 30% of this explained change, leaving the remaining 70% to generic
changes in production processes. Our theoretical framework is slightly more elaborated than his,
allowing us to identify more determinants, at the cost of using a specific functional form for the
production function, albeit quite general. In particular, we remain agnostic about the nature of
imperfect competition in both the product and the labour market and characterise it following a
reduced-form approach where a negatively sloped product demand curve and a positively sloped
labour supply curve introduce a wedge between marginal costs and marginal revenues in the optimal
firms’ plans. This wedge is assumed to be constant irrespective of what other firms do.
2.2 Firm heterogeneity
Our focus is on between-firm heterogeneity, as opposed to within-firm heterogeneity. The literature
has long recognised that some firms are more productive than others (e.g. Bernard et al., 2003;
Foster et al., 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Syverson, 2011; Aiello and Ricotta, 2015; Bartelsman
and Wolf, 2017) and pay higher wages, for equally skilled workers (e.g. Dunne et al., 2004; Abowd
et al., 1999; Goux and Maurin, 1999; Abowd et al., 2002; Gruetter and Lalive, 2009; Holzer et al.,
2011) —see also the comprehensive review of the evidence in Van Reenen (2018).
More recently, a new generation of papers has shown that these between-firm wage differentials
account for most of the overall wage inequality, and they have generally widened over time — see
Barth et al. (2016) and Song et al. (2018) for the US; Faggio et al. (2010) for the UK; Card et al.
(2013) for Germany; H˚akanson et al. (2015) for Sweden; Card et al. (2016) for Portugal; and
Elhanan Helpman and Oleg Itskhoki and Marc-Andreas Muendler and Stephen J. Redding (2017)
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and Alvarez et al. (2018) for Brazil.4 Evidence across OECD countries show that the productivity
gap between firms at the technology frontier and the rest has risen since the mid-2000s (Andrews
et al., 2016), as well as the prevalence of and the resources sunk in “zombie” firms (McGowan
et al., 2017); between-firm wage dispersion has also increased substantially, with most of the
between-firm wage variance being driven by differences in pay across firms within sectors rather
than by differences in average wages across sectors (Berlingieri et al., 2017). Also, Hartman-Glaser
et al. (2019) make the point that as volatility of productivity has increased, the owners of the firm
require an increased risk premium. Moreover, uncertainty about future productivity levels delays
exit and increases the importance of mega-firms. Both factors lower the labour share.
The availability of firm-level data has allowed researchers to assess the dispersion of product market
power —see among other De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) for the US, Tamminen and Chang
(2013) for Finland, Forlani et al. (2016) for Belgium. The general agreement is that product market
power has increased and has become more dispersed among firms (Epifani and Gancia, 2011; De
Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018; De Loecker et al., 2018).5 In addition to a marked increase in the
average markup (see previous section), De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) also document a substantial
increase in its dispersion, with the median markup remaining roughly constant, and the 90th
percentile increasing from 1.5 to 2.3. They relate the decrease in the aggregate labour share to the
increase in average market power; however, they do not make any connection with its increasing
dispersion.
A smaller number of papers look at labour market power, and they also find significant heterogeneity.
Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) infer the elasticity of labour supply at the firm level – a measure of
monopsonistic power – from the elasticity of the quit rates with respect to wages, and find for the
US elasticities between 2.4 and 3 for men and between 1.5 and 2.5 for women. (Hirsch et al., 2010)
for Germany and Weber (2015) for the US compute labour supply elasticities directly, using large
linked employer–employee datasets, and also find considerable variation, between 1.9 and 3.7 for
Germany and lognormally distributed with an average of 1.08 for the US.
Other papers look jointly at product and labour market power. Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013)
estimate production functions for different French manufacturing industries and compute firm
specific price-cost markups and elasticities of labour supply as a wedge between the factor elasticities
and their corresponding shares in revenues. They find considerable dispersion in both parameters.
Fe´lix and Portugal (2017) follow a similar approach for Portugal, while also decomposing the impact
of the estimated labour supply elasticity on wages within an efficient bargaining setting. They
estimate an average price-cost markup of 1.2, with a standard deviation of .3, and an average
wage elasticity of labour supply of 3.3, with a standard deviation of 4.2. They also show that
heterogeneity in monopsonistic power affects heterogeneity of wages across firms, with a one unit
increase in a firm’s labour supply elasticity being associated with an increase in earnings between 5
and 16 percent. Card et al. (2016) also link wage heterogeneity to labour market power, in terms of
a random utility model of worker preferences which leads to firm-specific labour supply elasticities.6
4Both Card et al. (2013) and Song et al. (2018) show that the increase in between-firm wage heterogeneity is
mostly due to increased worker sorting / assortative worker-firm matching (high-wage workers becoming increasingly
likely to work in high-wage firms) and segregation / assortative worker-worker matching (high-wage workers becoming
increasingly likely to work with each other), with little role for an increase of firm fixed effect.
5Ferna´ndez et al. (2015) show that in Spain heterogeneity in markups has increased significantly in some sectors
(professional services, telecommunications, accommodation and food, utilities) after the Great Recession, while it has
decreased in others (manufacturing).
6Another paper is Hornstein et al. (2011), which in the context of a search model obtain smaller wage dispersion.
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Finally, the substantial heterogeneity in relative price variation, as measured typically by sectoral
inflation and inflation persistence, is well documented (see, among others Blinder et al., 1998; Bils
and Klenow, 2004; Lu¨nnemann and Matha¨, 2004; Bilke, 2005; Clark, 2006; Altissimo et al., 2009;
Boivin et al., 2009; Wolman, 2011; Duarte and Restuccia, 2016; Kato and Okuda, 2017).
While remaining agnostic about the causes of between-firm heterogeneity, we look at the evidence of
increased dispersion in wages, productivity, product and labour market power and relative inflation,
and relate it to the observed changes in the labour share, for the UK manufacturing sector. As
already anticipated, we find that between-firm heterogeneity is an important determinant of the
aggregate labour share, particularly heterogeneity in total factor productivity and labour market
power. However, its contribution has remained fairly constant over time, and therefore cannot
explain the observed decline in the aggregate labour share.
3 Model
A well-studied though often neglected result from the neoclassical theory of production is that
when input and output prices and quantities are heterogeneous across firms, or when firms differ in
terms of fundamental factors like total factor productivity, aggregation of firms’ technologies into a
single production function is not possible (Green, 1964; Fisher, 1969; Zambelli, 2004; Felipe and
McCombie, 2014). Thus, under firm heterogeneity the aggregate labour share cannot be computed
with reference to an optimal production plan of a “representative firm”, using aggregates of input
and output prices and factors. Instead, it must be computed adding up labour costs and value added
across firms. Here we use a simple neoclassical model of firm behaviour in order to characterise the
relationship between the distribution of firms’ characteristics and the aggregate labour share in the
economy, in a partial equilibrium setting.
3.1 Setup
First, let us define the firm level labour share, upon which all the analysis is built. This is:
λi ≡ wiLi
piYi
(1)
where wi are wages, Li is the level of employment, pi is output price, and Yi is real value added,
for a given firm i.7
The aggregate labour share, defined as aggregate labour costs over aggregate value added, can then
be expressed as a weighted average of λi:
λ ≡
∑
i wiLi∑
i piYi
=
∑
i
λiδi (2)
7In practice, workers are heterogeneous (e.g. in terms of skills, type of contract, or hours worked). However, most
datasets, including ours, only report the total number of employees. Therefore, because of necessity rather than
desire, the theory assumes workers are homogeneous within the firm. In the empirical analysis, wiLi is taken to be
the reported total labour costs, which means wi is defined as the average wage per worker.
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where δi =
piYi∑
i piYi
corresponds to the share of aggregate value added produced by firm i.
Our aim is to characterise λ in terms of firms’ choices. Since the latter depends on λi, which in turns
depends on YiLi , we need assumptions about technology, market structure and firm’s behaviour which
enables us to find the optimal YiLi ratio for firms. Our starting point is a value added production
function (i.e. a mathematical relation between capital, labour and value added).8 In particular, we
assume a CES production function:
Yi = Ai (αLρi + (1− α)Kρi )
1
ρ (3)
where σ = 11−ρ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour (hence: ρ < 1). Notice
firms have the same technology in terms of elasticities (ρ and α), but they might have heterogeneous
total factor productivity (TFP), Ai. A justification for the assumptions in equation (3) is presented
later, once the main result is obtained.
We assume firms have a certain degree of monopolistic power in the pricing of the final good.
Importantly, the degree of market power might be heterogeneous across firms. Formally, firms face
an inverse demand function for their good given bypi(Yi) = f(ηYi ,ΘYi ), where ηYi corresponds to
the own-price elasticity of output demand, and ΘYi refers to arbitrary characteristics of the product
Yi, idiosyncratic to firm i, which are valuable to consumers. Similarly, we assume firms have some
degree of monopsony power in the labour market, which could also be heterogeneous across firms
(for example, because of some non-pecuniary location effects valued by workers). Formally, firms
face an inverse labour supply function given by wi(Li) = g(ηLi ,ΘLi ), where ηLi is the own-price
elasticity of the labour supply, and ΘLi represents idiosyncratic firm characteristics, valuable for
workers. The role of ΘYi and ΘLi is to permit heterogeneous prices and wages even when firms
have the same level of market power, or when they have no market power at all. The latter is not
unknown to the literature, both in the case of firms with an homogeneous final good (Dahlby and
West, 1986; Hosken and Reiffen, 2004) and homogeneous labour (Rosen, 1987; Hamermesh, 1999).
With the above assumptions in place, the profit function of the firm is Πi(Li,Ki) = pi(Yi)Yi −
wi(Li)Li − riKi. The first order condition with respect to labour is given by:
∂Yi
∂Li
≡ αAρi (Yi)1−ρ(Li)ρ−1 =
(
wi
pi
)
χLi
χYi
(4)
where χLi = 1 + 1ηL
i
and χYi = 1 + 1ηY
i
. The term χ
L
i
χY
i
represents the wedge between the real wage
and the marginal product of labour when markets are not perfectly competitive. The higher labour
and/or product market power are, the higher this ratio is. Conversely, in the case of perfectly
competitive product and labour markets (i.e. ηLi =∞ and ηYi = −∞), χ
L
i
χY
i
= 1. Note that profit
maximisation requires |ηYi | > 1, so that χYi is always positive.
8The existence of a value added production function hinges on some assumption about the underlying gross
output production function (which relates capital, labour and intermediate inputs to gross output), as Bruno (1978)
demonstrated. In particular, the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs and the rest of inputs (in
our case, capital and labour) must be either zero (i.e. a Leontief) or infinity (i.e. a linear production function).
Alternatively, a value added production function is well defined when the relative price of intermediate inputs to
output is constant. Unfortunately, because of the multiple non-linearities in our model, we were unable to test the
elasticity of substitution of the gross output production function linked to our model (a nested CES). Regarding the
price condition, we do not observe the price of intermediary inputs, and so cannot test this assumption either. For
further details on the gross output production function associated with our model, see Appendix A.
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From equation (4) we obtain the optimal LiYi as a function of the firm characteristics:
Li
Yi
=
(
αwiχ
Y
i
piχLi
) 1
1−ρ
A
ρ
1−ρ
i (5)
This is then replaced into the formula for the firm level labour share (equation 1), leading to:
λi =
(
αχYi
χLi
) 1
1−ρ (Aipi
wi
) ρ
1−ρ
(6)
A few insights are worth pointing out here. First, λi does not explicitly depend on the size of the
firm (either in terms of Ki or Li). This property emanates from the fact that the CES function is
homothetic. This means it has a linear expansion path, which is to say, optimal Ki/Li and Li/Yi
ratios are constant. However, a correlation between λi and firm size might be observed in practice,
provided the other determinants of λi (TFP, market power, wages or prices) do depend on the
size of the firm. In effect, there is evidence of such correlation, not the least because bigger firms
tend to be more productive and have more market power (e.g. Autor et al., 2017b; Schwellnus
et al., 2018). Additionally, in our framework, wages and prices do depend on Li whenever there is
imperfect competition.
Second, the effect on the labour share of all parameters but market power depends on the sign of ρ.
For instance, a ceteris paribus increase in TFP increases (decreases) λi if ρ is positive (negative).
Meanwhile, both higher monopoly power (i.e. a decrease in χYi ) and higher monopsony power (i.e.
an increase in χLi ) lower λi. In the limiting case of ρ = 0 (Cobb-Douglas), only market power affects
λi.9
Third, there is a close relationship between the pay-productivity disconnect (with productivity
understood as TFP) and the labour share. In particular, the latter changes whenever a given
increase in TPF does not translate into a similar increase in the real wage (i.e when Aipiwi falls).
Again, the final effect depends on ρ. Further analysis of the effect of individual firm level variables
on the firm level and aggregate labour share is presented in Appendix C.
Finally, notice we do not model firms’ choice of capital, as it is not needed in our framework. This
does not mean capital is necessarily fixed. Rather, we remain agnostic about the precise capital
accumulation mechanism (for instance, in addition to the first order optimality condition for capital,
firms might take into account adjustment costs to the capital stock).
3.2 Heterogeneity and the aggregate labour share
Ultimately, we are interested in the effects of firm heterogeneity on the aggregate labour share.
Replacing the individual firm labour share λi into equation (2) leads to the following expression for
9In particular, in the Cobb-Douglas case the labour share is equal to αχ
Y
i
χL
i
. Perfect competition yields the familiar
result that λi = α.
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the aggregate labour share:
λ =
∑
i
(
αχYi
χLi
) 1
1−ρ (Aipi
wi
) ρ
1−ρ
δi (7)
We measure firm heterogeneity with respect to an hypothetical “average” firm. More specifically,
for given relative weights {ωi} we define A¯ =
∑
i ωiAi, w¯ =
∑
i ωiwi, p¯ =
∑
i ωipi, χ¯
Y =∑
i ωiχ
Y
i , χ¯
L =
∑
i ωiχ
L
i . This is, we compute a weighted average of all heterogeneous parameters
in the model, which then define the parameters of the benchmark firm.
It is natural to weight variables by some measure of firm size. Whilst employment might seem
a reasonable option, there is often significant capital-labour variability at a similar employment
level (something which is true in our data too). Since a given level of value added can be achieved
with different capital and labour combinations, we consider value added a more suited weighting
variable. In effect, value added (or sales) is also one often used in the literature to aggregate firms
(e.g. De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018; De Loecker et al., 2018, in the context of mark-ups). Notice
however that the method itself is agnostic regarding the weights chosen. What is needed is that
heterogeneity is quantified with respect to a given counterfactual, just as the variance is computed
with respect to a mean. As long as there is heterogeneity in a given dimension (except capital alone,
as Proposition 1 below states), such decomposition is always possible.
Having defined weighted averages for every variable we can then re-write the aggregate LS as:
λ = λHOM
∑
i
(
χYi
χ¯Y
) 1
1−ρ ( χ¯L
χLi
) 1
1−ρ (Ai
A¯
) ρ
1−ρ
(
w¯
wi
) ρ
1−ρ
(
pi
p¯
) ρ
1−ρ
δi (8)
where λHOM is the labour share of the counterfactual firm, and defined as:
λHOM =
(
α¯χ¯Y
χ¯L
) 1
1−ρ ( A¯p¯
w¯
) ρ1−ρ
(9)
Equation (8) is our decomposition formula, which shows that any form of heterogeneity affects
the aggregate labour share, with the exception of capital alone. If firms differ only with respect
to capital, their labour shares are identical (see equation 6).10 The proof can be trivially seen in
equation (2), once we assume λi = λHOM .
The following proposition summarises the CES result:
Proposition 1. Assume firms have identical CES technologies (i.e. α and ρ are the same across
firms), and ρ 6= 0 (i.e. technology is not Cobb-Douglas). Then, it is true that:
(i) heterogeneity in wages, price dynamics, TFP or market power affects the aggregate labour
share (directly and through δi);
10Incidentally, this is exactly the case where an aggregate production function exists, namely when firms only differ
in their size. Because they have identical K/L ratios, it is possible to mechanically redistribute factor of productions
among them without altering factor prices (abstracting from competition considerations). Equivalently, it is possible
to combine all firms into one big firm; the production function of this firm “becomes” the aggregate production
function of the economy.
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(ii) heterogeneity in capital affects the aggregate labour share (through δi) only if other forms of
heterogeneity are also present.
Notice the decomposition formula is purely descriptive of the optimal production plans of the
different firms, reflecting the partial equilibrium of the model. Yet, provided we can produce
an estimate for each element in equation (8), this is sufficient for our purposes. This partial
equilibrium approach assumes any observed dataset reflects a situation of general equilibrium. The
drawback of this partial method is, of course, that we cannot provide a deeper understanding of
why heterogeneity in wages and prices occurs in the first place.
This result can be contrasted with the Cobb-Douglas case, where the aggregate LS is:
λ = αχ¯
Y
χ¯L
∑
i
(
χYi
χ¯Y
)(
χ¯L
χLi
)
δi (8′)
This highlights that for firm heterogeneity to affect the aggregate labour share if the technology is
Cobb-Douglas, there must be heterogeneous imperfect competition. With perfect competition (where
an exact aggregate production function exists), λ = α, a well-known property of a Cobb-Douglas
production function. The following proposition summarises the result:
Corollary 1. Assume firms have identical Cobb-Douglas technologies (i.e. α is the same). If
market power is homogeneous across firms (including the limit case of perfect competition), then
firm heterogeneity is irrelevant for the aggregate labour share: the labour share is identical across
firms and equal to α. On the other hand, with heterogeneous market power, firm heterogeneity of
any dimension affects the aggregate labour share. In particular, heterogeneity in capital, wages,
prices and TFP affect the labour share indirectly through δi.
The above result is very simple but makes an important point, given the extensive use of Cobb-
Douglas production functions with perfect competition in the literature: even when firms are
heterogeneous along many dimensions (including TFP), and an aggregate production function hence
does not exist, in competitive markets, the aggregate labour share only depends on technology.
On the other hand, a CES enables a richer set of determinants for the labour share, reason why
it is our preferred choice. However, it might seem odd that in our CES analysis we assume the
production function to be homogeneous across firms (i.e. common parameters ρ and α). This is
necessary as allowing heterogeneity in ρ impedes decomposition, and allowing heterogeneity in α
greatly complicates estimation (see Appendix A for details).
Our last remark is on the choice of a value added production function. Using a gross output
production function does not yield a decomposable formula for the aggregate labour share, except
when the conditions suggested by Bruno (1978) are fulfilled. This is, when a value added production
function exists, as assumed here. Appendix A provides further insights on these points.
3.3 Exercise: A mean-preserving increase in wage dispersion
To better illustrate the implications of equation (8), we now consider the case of a mean-preserving
increase the dispersion of one variable only, namely wages.
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Figure 1: A VA-weighted mean-preserving spread of wages, ρ < 0.
w −∆1 w w + ∆2
f(wi) = Cwi
−ρ
1−ρ
λHOM
λ
wi
f(wi)
For simplicity, we consider only two (types of) firms i = {1, 2}. We start from a situation where the
two firms are identical, with wage w. Since the LS does not depend on the firm’s size, both firms
(and the aggregate economy) have the same labour share, λ. Now, consider an exogenous value
added-weighted mean-preserving spread in wages. This is, a change in wages such that their weighted
average (using value added as weights) yields w. Mathematically, for new wages w1 = w + ∆1 and
w2 = w −∆2, this is true if ∆1 = ∆2 δ2δ1 , where δi represents the firm’s share of value added in the
economy with this new set of wages.11
In this setting, each firm’s LS is (equation 8):
λi = Cwi
−ρ
1−ρ (10)
where C =
(
αχY
χL
) 1
1−ρ (Ap)
ρ
1−ρ (the part of the labour share which is identical across firms).
This function is monotonically increasing in wages and concave for ρ < 0, and monotonically
decreasing in wages and convex for ρ > 0. The case of ρ < 0 is depicted in figure 1. The aggregate
LS is a weighted mean of the individual LS, with weights equal to δi (equation 2). Jensen’s
inequality ensures that the aggregate LS is lower the bigger the dispersion in wages, ∆. In other
words, starting from a situation of firm homogeneity, an increase in the dispersion of wages, such
that the counterfactual firm is identical to the ones existed before the change (hence the purpose
of the mean-preserving spread), leads to a fall in the aggregate LS if the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour is lower than one. Again, notice the limiting case of the Cobb-Douglas,
where dispersion in wages alone does not change the aggregate LS, which is constant over wi.
The reason why the aggregate LS falls in the example above is nothing else than Jensen’s inequality,
given the shape of the LS function. But why does the LS function depend on ρ? To understand
this, let’s first look at the first derivative, and explain why the LS is increasing in wages for ρ < 0,
11One might suggest here that the aggregate demand for labour in the two scenarios has not been restricted to be
the same. However, the labour supply has not been restricted either (in fact, nothing has been said about the source
of the change in wages). Being our model a partial equilibrium one, we assume any resource constraints are fulfilled.
In other words, prices represent an equilibrium.
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and decreasing for ρ > 0. Consider first the case of ρ < 0, where there is relatively low degree
of substitution between capital and labour. Starting from a given wage w, an increase in such
wage by ∆ produces a fall in employment and in value added. Yet, because of low substitution
between K and L, such fall in output is relatively significant. Thus, L/Y falls (because of CRS),
but not so much. In fact, precisely because of this low substitution, the firm labour share actually
increases (recall the labour share is wp
L
Y ). This is, the “price effect” outweighs the “quantity effect”.
Conversely, if ρ > 0 (high substitution), L/Y falls considerably more, in which case the quantity
effect dominates and the labour share falls. In the Cobb-Douglas case, these two effects cancel out.
Let’s now look at the second derivative, and explain why the LS is concave in wages for ρ < 0, and
convex for ρ > 0. Consider again the case of ρ < 0. As we said, an increase in the wage from w by
∆ lowers L/Y by relatively little. As we further increase wages by ∆, L/Y falls again, but because
of decreasing marginal product of labour, the overall change in Y gets smaller, and therefore L/Y
falls (again because of CRS) in an increasing fashion, as employment just cannot raise output fast
enough. In turn, the price effect of higher w, which always outweighs the quantity effect for ρ < 0,
is less capable of rising the labour share. This effect plateaus in the limit (i.e. as w ∞−→); hence
its concavity. The argument is the same for the case of ρ > 0. Recall that when ρ > 0 the LS is
decreasing with wages, as the quantity effect outweighs the price effect. Yet, because of decreasing
marginal product of labour, such outweighing looses force with wi and it plateaus in the limit;
hence its convexity.
The above example of wage heterogeneity also holds in the case of an unweighted mean-preserving
spread of wages (i.e. where ∆1 = ∆2 = ∆). The only difference is that the counterfactual wage
that produces an equivalent level to that of the new (heterogeneous) aggregate LS is no longer w
but w −∆(δ2 − δ1). This level is lower (higher) than w for ρ < 0 (ρ > 0), only strengthening the
result. Furthermore, it can be shown that the same conclusion arises for changes from an already
heterogeneous economy, under plausible circumstances.
Finally, a similar analysis to that of wages could be made for other sources of heterogeneity. The
ultimate behaviour of a given increase in heterogeneity rests on the exponent of the term in the
firm level LS function. For instance, for ρ < 0, an increase in productivity dispersion leads to an
increase in the aggregate LS.
3.4 Distributional characterisation
Proposition 1 is very general. In particular, it does not quantify how heterogeneity affects the
aggregate labour share: the summation term in equation (8) is obscure enough for this to be seen.
In order to shed more light on the issue, we approximate each of the fractions inside the summation
term in equation (8) by means of a second-order Taylor expansion around the respective weighted
average. For each z = {χY , χL, A,w, p}, this approximation is:
(zi
z¯
)φ
≈ 1 + φ
(
∆z,i
z¯
)
+ φ(φ− 1)2
(
∆z,i
z¯
)2
(11)
where z¯ is the weighted mean of the respective variable, and ∆zi = zi − z¯ is the deviation from
that mean. After dropping all interaction terms of order higher than two, equation (8) can be
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approximated by:12
λ ≈λHOM
∑
i
δi
[
1 + 1
1− ρ
(
∆χYi
χ¯Y
)
− 1
1− ρ
(
∆χLi
χ¯L
)
+ ρ
1− ρ
(∆Ai
A¯
)
− ρ
1− ρ
(∆wi
w¯
)
+ ρ
1− ρ
(∆pi
p¯
)
+ ρ
2(1− ρ)2
(
∆χYi
χ¯Y
)2
+ 2− ρ
2(1− ρ)2
(
∆χLi
χ¯L
)2
+ ρ(2ρ− 1)
2(1− ρ)2
(∆Ai
A¯
)2
+ ρ
2(1− ρ)2
(∆wi
w¯
)2
+ ρ(2ρ− 1)
2(1− ρ)2
(∆pi
p¯
)2
− 1
(1− ρ)2
(
∆χYi
χ¯Y
)(
∆χLi
χ¯L
)
+ ρ
(1− ρ)2
(
∆χYi
χ¯Y
)(∆Ai
A¯
)
− ρ
(1− ρ)2
(
∆χYi
χ¯Y
)(∆wi
w¯
)
+ ρ
(1− ρ)2
(
∆χYi
χ¯Y
)(∆pi
p¯
)
− ρ
(1− ρ)2
(
∆χLi
χ¯L
)(∆Ai
A¯
)
+ ρ
(1− ρ)2
(
∆χLi
χ¯L
)(∆wi
w¯
)
− ρ
(1− ρ)2
(
∆χLi
χ¯L
)(∆pi
p¯
)
− ρ
2
(1− ρ)2
(∆Ai
A¯
)(∆wi
w¯
)
+ ρ
2
(1− ρ)2
(∆Ai
A¯
)(∆pi
p¯
)
− ρ
2
(1− ρ)2
(∆wi
w¯
)(∆pi
p¯
)]
This can be simplified further. First, notice that when z¯ is defined using value added as weights,∑
i δi∆zi = 0. Thus, the first four terms in the parenthesis above (representing the weighted sum
of all deviations from the weighted average) are zero. Second, notice that
∑
i δi(∆zi)2 = Var(z)
and
∑
i δi∆xi∆zi = Cov(x, z), with both defined as value added weighted measures, and not in the
standard, unweighted fashion. Then, we can restate our decomposition formula solely in terms of
variances and covariances or, equivalently, in terms of correlations (r) and coefficient of variations
(CV), both of which are dimensionless and scale invariant:
λ ≈λHOM
∑
i
δi
[
1
+ ρ
2(1− ρ)2 CV
2(χYi ) +
2− ρ
2(1− ρ)2 CV
2(χLi ) +
ρ(2ρ− 1)
2(1− ρ)2 CV
2(Ai) +
ρ
2(1− ρ)2 CV
2(wi) +
ρ(2ρ− 1)
2(1− ρ)2 CV
2(pi)
− 1
(1− ρ)2 r(χ
Y , χL)CV(χY )CV(χL) + ρ
(1− ρ)2 r(χ
Y , A)CV(χY )CV(A)− ρ
(1− ρ)2 r(χ
Y , w)CV(χY )CV(w)
+ ρ
(1− ρ)2 r(χ
Y , p)CV(χY )CV(p)− ρ
(1− ρ)2 r(χ
L, A)CV(χL)CV(A) + ρ
(1− ρ)2 r(χ
L, w)CV(χL)CV(w)
− ρ
(1− ρ)2 r(χ
L, p)CV(χL)CV(p)− ρ
2
(1− ρ)2 r(A,w)CV(A)CV(w) +
ρ2
(1− ρ)2 r(A, p)CV(A)CV(p)
− ρ
2
(1− ρ)2 r(w, p)CV(w)CV(p)
]
(12)
This final equation reflects that it’s the joint distribution of all the variables that affects the
aggregate labour share. In particular, heterogeneity in each variable (defined in terms of the
coefficient of variation), increases or decreases the aggregate labour share, depending on ρ. The
only exception is monopsony power: an increase in the dispersion of monopsony power always
increases the aggregate labour share (remember ρ < 1). Importantly, heterogeneity matters even if
all variables are orthogonal to each other, i.e if all correlations are zero. As this is not likely to
be the case however, the correlation structure does matter, at it pushes up or down the aggregate
labour share again depending on ρ, for most variables.
The above result is summarised in the following proposition.
12For instance, terms like ∆Ai
A¯
∆χYi
χ¯Y
∆χLi
χ¯L
and ∆Ai
A¯
(
∆χYi
χ¯Y
)2
are dropped. In our empirical analysis, this omitted
residual is never above 5% of the exact value.
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Proposition 2. If firms have a CES technology with identical α and ρ and constant returns to
scale, the aggregate labour share is approximately given by equation (12). Hence, the effect of firm
heterogeneity on the labour share depends on the joint distribution of all heterogeneous variables,
and for most of the variables, on ρ. For the most empirically relevant case (i.e. when the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labour is smaller than 1, that is to say, ρ < 0), and other things
being equal, an increase in the dispersion of productivity or monopsony power increases the aggregate
labour share, while an increase in the dispersion of wages or product market power decreases it.
Other things being equal, an increase in the correlation between labour market power and TFP, or
between product market power and wages increases the aggregate labour share, whereas an increase
in the correlation between product market power and labour market power, product market power
and TFP, labour market power and wages, or TFP and wages decreases it.
The implications of Proposition 2 are somewhat difficult to visualise, as any change in firm-level
variables will typically trigger a change in the market shares. This in turns will cause a change in
λHOM , which refers to the hypothetical labour share of a weighted average firm. Hence, the ceteris
paribus clause typically won’t hold in simple thought experiments. Returning to our example in
section 3.3, in the case of nominal wage heterogeneity only equation (12) simplifies to:
λ ≈ λHOM
[
1 + ρ2(1− ρ)2 CV
2(w)
]
(12′)
In section 3.3 we showed the effects of a mean-preserving increase in wage dispersion, that is a
case where λHOM remains constant while CV(w) increases. We also showed that the result still
holds (and is indeed reinforced) if the increase in wage dispersion happens around the unweighted
mean, rather than the weighted one. Equation 12′ quantifies the effect. Recall that for keeping
the weighted mean (hence, λHOM ) constant, we need to have ∆1 = ∆2 δ2δ1 : the increase in wages at
firm 1 is bigger than the decrease at firm 2. To keep the unweighted mean constant we have to
further lower wages at firm 2. This effectively lowers λHOM . Hence, the aggregate labour share
falls because of both a reduction in λHOM and an increase in CV(w), when ρ < 0.
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4.1 Sample
Equation (12) provides a model-based decomposition of the aggregate labour share in terms of firm
heterogeneity vis-a-vis a counterfactual firm. We apply this decomposition to the manufacturing
sector in Great Britain (UK without Northern Ireland), for the 1998-2014 period.14 We focus
on the manufacturing sector because value added is very imperfectly measured in other sectors,
13Unfortunately, we are unable to provide the data underlying our results because this can only be accessed
through the UK Data Service’s secure lab. Nevertheless, we plan to make our code public, so anyone with access
to the dataset can reproduce our results. Information about the dataset and how to access it can be found at
http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7989-4
14Although our analysis is for Geat Britain only, for simplicity to the reader, we refer to our sample as the UK. The
approximation might still be valid enough, given that during the sample period, manufacturing’s GVA in Northern
Ireland has been constantly below 3% of the UK-wide level, according to ONS data.
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where intermediate inputs are less clearly identified – see for instance the discussion in Autor et al.
(2017b).
We use data from the Annual Respondent Database (ARD), which contains a census of all enterprises
with at least 250 employees, plus a sample of all those firms with less than 250 employees.15 The
dataset has information both at the plant and “reporting unit” level. The latter is the smallest unit
that contains detailed financial information needed for the analysis (like labour costs, investment,
and so on), and so it is our working definition of firm. Still, most of firms only have one plant (for
example, 97% in 2014). We focus only on manufacturing, where a production function at the firm
level is more likely to be well defined.16
Several sample selection procedures were made. First, firms with less than 10 employees were
dropped. This is because for small firms (and particularly for firms with 1 or 2 employees, the bulk
of those dropped) the level of wages might not so much be associated with market mechanism,
as both capital income and labour income can be used to reward the firm’s owners (combination
which might depend on the tax system). This might distort the computation of the labour share
in ways unrelated to the theory.17 Second, non-profit and other non-market oriented firms were
excluded, as these are less likely to be characterised by profit maximising behaviour. Third, firms
with missing information (e.g. no investment data, needed to compute capital stocks) were also
dropped. Fourth, outliers in terms of top and bottom 0.5% percentiles, computed independently
for different variables (including firm level labour share, Y/L and L/K), were discarded. The final
sample used contains 115,150 observations, covering around 38,000 unique firms. In any case, all the
analysis presented here is carried out using turnover-based sampling weights, in order to represent
the whole sector as good as possible.
4.2 Variables not in ARD
Although ARD is a very rich dataset, in terms of our needs it only contains information on number
of employees, total labour costs (including pension funds contributions) and value added (the
latter either directly available, or computed using gross output and intermediaries, when missing).
Therefore, we need to either add or produce our own estimates for the remaining terms, namely
firm-level prices, TFP, production function parameters (α and ρ), and product and factor market
power. We also need to impute the capital stock of the firm.
15ARD covers the Non-Financial Business Economy of Great Britain, between 1998 and 2014. In terms of SIC07
codes, all sectors are included except O (Public administration, defence and compulsory social security), T (mainly
activities of households as employers of domestic personnel), U (activities of extraterritorial organisations), sections
01.1 to 01.5 (inclusive) of Agriculture, section 65.3 of Financial and Insurance activities, any educational activity
carried out by the public sector in P, section 86.2 (medical and dental practice activities) and any other public
provision of human health and social work activities in Q. The coverage is around two-thirds of the GB gross
value added. The sample does not cover self-employees (formally called sole proprietors or traders), unless they are
registered with the UK tax authority, HMRC (which is not necessary for businesses below a given income threshold).
For further details, see ONS (2012).
16As suggested by Schwellnus et al. (2017), we drop subsector 19 in the SIC07 classification (“manufacturing of
coke and refined petroleum”), because of the noise introduced by the volatility of oil prices.
17Two things must be mentioned here. First, regarding the actual threshold of 10 employees, ARD is based on
stratified sampling, using industry, region and employment size as strata. The latter uses 0-9 employees band as one
cell for sampling. Hence, it is natural to exclude the whole band together. Second, firms with less than 10 employees
tend not to be sampled in consecutive years. This means their capital stock cannot be imputed, nor be used in the
production function estimation (see Appendix D). These issues and other information about sampling in ARD can
be found in ONS (2012).
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Prices
Our theory is build upon firm-level prices; however, no price information is available in ARD.
Instead, we use the most disaggregated industry-level producer price index available (4 digits),
provided by the Office for National Statistics.
There are, of course, differences between the industry price index and the firm price level, pi. In
practice however, using the former is not only our only option but it is, theoretically speaking,
more informative. To see this, notice that in the theory, pi refers to the price of a unit of physical
output (or “real” value added), e.g. apples. This poses two difficulties. On the one hand, the unit
of measurement of prices is arbitrary. For instance, if we were to measure pi in terms of a kilo of
apples instead of a unit of apples, the price level would change. On the other hand, comparing
the price level of different goods (e.g. apples with cars) is uninformative. Because of these issues,
price heterogeneity among heterogeneous goods can only be made sense if the price of goods are
normalised to a common unit. This is precisely the goal of a price index.18
To see this more clearly, define as pj,0 the price level in sector j in the base period of the index,
and pij = pj/pj,0 as the sectoral price index. We do not observe pi but the pij to which the firm
belongs. Thus, in all the theoretical analysis presented so far, we could replace pi with pij . In other
words, when we talk about price heterogeneity, we are referring to a relative price heterogeneity,
in the sense that it is the change in the measure which is informative, and not the level. In
effect, by construction, price heterogeneity is zero in the base year. Again, this is the only type of
heterogeneity which is informative when dealing with heterogeneous goods.
Now, the replacement of pi with pij induces a second change. If we are dividing pi by pj,0, we must
also multiply it somewhere else. As it turns out, it is the TFP term which captures the extra
pj,0 because, as shown later, TFP is estimated from a regression where value added is deflated by
the same price index. Thus, when we replace pi with pij , we are also replacing Ai with A˜i, where
A˜i = Aipj,0. This transformation is not a problem. In fact, TFP suffers from the same problem
than prices. Notice that the units of measurement of TFP are directly related to those of output.
Thus, if we are talking about heterogeneous goods like apples and cars, comparing Ai levels across
firms is just as uninformative as comparing pi across firms. Thus, TFP must also be normalised in
order to be comparable. And pj,0 is precisely such a normalisation.
In summary, by replacing firm level prices with that of an industry-level index (in terms of the
equations, by replacing pi with pij and Ai with A˜i), we achieve an empirical implementation of the
general theoretical result, where the interpretation of price and TFP heterogeneity is informative.
For notation economy though, we keep using pi and Ai.
Estimation of TFP, α and ρ
A very important element of the model not available in the sample is a measure of firms’ total
factor productivity, Ait. Additionally, we do not observe the production function parameters α
and ρ. The solution is to estimate the CES value added production function, like that in equation
(3). As extensively noted in the literature (e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996), it is necessary to account
18Notice that the two issues are independent. If firm-level prices were available, we could construct a price index
based on firm level prices. As these are not available, we use industry level prices as a proxy.
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for the potential endogeneity of employment which, being a variable factor, might respond to
contemporary unobserved shocks to TFP. This is done following the “dynamic panel” method,
proposed by Blundell and Bond (2000). In this method, unobserved TFP is assumed to follow an
AR(1) with parameter θ, and the model is then θ-differentiated, and estimated with GMM.19 This
dynamic panel approach is preferred to the, also common, control function method, because the
latter is more demanding on the data, reducing the sample size.
Full details of the estimation method are presented in Appendix D. Here we just highlight that the
estimated elasticity of substitution (for the manufacturing sector as a whole) is 0.48 (ρˆ = −1.07),
significant at the 1% confidence level. This elasticity implies capital and labour are gross substitutes,
a result that is generally consistent with other firm-level evidence (an example using UK data is
Barnes et al., 2008).
Importantly, the firm-level capital stock is not available in the data, and yet it is required for
estimating the production function. We therefore impute capital using a combination of the
perpetual inventory method and information from the capital stock for the whole sector, obtained
from the Office for National Statistics. See Appendix D for further details.20
Finally, having estimated α and ρ, we can use the production function to compute Aˆit as a residual.21
This can be done also for observations not used in the estimation of the production function (for
example, because of missing data in a given year). This means that the final sample used for the
decomposition is larger than the one used in the regression. For details, see Appendix D.
Market power
Labour and product market power are defined in terms of labour supply and output demand
elasticities, respectively. As these are not directly observable, we calibrate χLi and χYi using proxies.
For labour market power, we start by measuring the employment share of each firm in the local
labour market they are situated. Importantly, this share is computed for each occupational group,
after which a weighted average is produced for each firm. The aim of this occupation-adjusted share
is to reflect different occupational composition of firms vis-a-vis that of the local labour market (e.g.
a firm employing mostly high skill workers in a local labour market with mostly low skill workers
has more market power than a firm mostly employing low skill workers in the same local labour
19The resulting model is highly non-linear (see equation (25) in Appendix D), and GMM does not converge on
our data (in effect, most of the literature estimates Cobb-Douglas production functions, which are log-linear in the
parameters). We therefore estimated a translog production function, which is a non-linear approximation of the CES
around an elasticity of substitution equal to 1. According to Monte Carlo simulations in Lagomarsino (2017), the
bias of a second order (i.e. non-linear) Taylor approximation of a two-input CES is neglectible for ρ > −1, and it is
still relatively small at ρ = −2. Our main estimates situate ρ around -1.07.
20Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2016) show that measurement errors in the capital stock introduce a downward
bias in the estimates of the production function parameters. To deal with the problem, they suggest a hybrid
IV-Control function approach that instruments capital with lagged investment. However, the method relies on
log-linearity and is therefore not directly applicable outside a Cobb-Douglas setting.
21As explained in Appendix D, it is impossible to identify the shock to value added. This is therefore included in
the computation of Aˆit. This introduces a bias in the latter, which is constant as long as the variance of the shock to
value added is also constant. For further details, see also footnote 34.
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market).22 The local labour market is understood to be a “travel to work area” (TTWA).23 The
final measure of hiring concentration ranges between 0 and 1.
We then need to map the measure of monopsony power derived above (which we denote as sit) into
the labour supply elasticity faced by the firm, ηLit. The method we use is relatively simple. Notice
that the elasticity of supply is a number that goes between 0 and ∞. Therefore, any relationship
between sit and ηLit must be such that, in competitive markets, sit ≈ 0, whereas in complete
monopsony power, sit ≈ 1. Albeit there are several functional forms producing such relationship, a
flexible one is
ηLit = −c1
(
1
ln (1− sit)
)c2
This is flexible because it is possible to shape this function by changing the positive terms c1 and
c2, holding the end points mentioned above fixed. These constants are chosen in order to match
the scarce evidence available in the literature about ηLit at the firm level. In effect, we match two
empirical properties of ηLit. First, Manning (2003) estimates an average firm level elasticity of supply
for the UK of around 0.75. Second, Webber (2015) provides a characterisation of the distribution
of this elasticity for the US, from where it is possible to calibrate with decent fit a log-normal
distribution of this elasticity.24 For lack of a better alternative, we assume the UK also follows this
distribution, but scaled to match the UK average estimated by Manning (2003).25 This enable us
to compute c1 and c2 (found to be 0.01 and 0.37 respectively).
Regarding product market power, our theory defines this in terms of the firm’s elasticity of demand.
Albeit this is also unobserved, there is a direct relationship between this elasticity and the mark-up
(price over marginal cost). In particular, under monopolistic competition, if the mark-up of a firm
is µ, with µ ≥ 1, its elasticity of demand is ηL = − µµ−1 . We compute the firm-level mark-up as the
sales to total variable costs’ ratio, which approximates marginal costs with average (e.g. Branston
et al., 2014; De Loecker et al., 2018).26
4.3 Theoretical versus empirical decomposition
Before moving forward, an important issue must be dealt with. The decomposition formulas are
built upon the optimisation behaviour of firms. Thus, they refer to the predicted labour share of
22Unfortunately, ARD does not contain information on the skill level of the workers employed. These are instead
imputed from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). In particular, we compute the share of workers in
each of the nine occupation groups (SOC2010 major groups), in a given industry (SIC07 division), and year. Then,
we assign this share to firms in ARD in that given industry-year cluster. Total employment for each occupation
group in the local labour market is also computed from ASHE.
23The official documentation from the Office for National Statistics defines a TTWA as “[i]n concept, a self-contained
labour market area is one in which all commuting occurs within the boundary of that area. In practice, it is not
possible to divide the UK into entirely separate labour market areas as commuting patterns are too diffuse. TTWAs
have been developed as approximations to self-contained labour markets reflecting areas where most people both
live and work.” More details about the definition and methodology for computing the TTWA can be found in
https://ons.maps.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=379c0cdb374f4f1e94209e908e9a21d9.
24In particular, we fit a log-normal distribution using the percentiles presented in Table 6 in Webber (2015).
25Notice Manning (2003) derives an elasticity for the whole economy. In consequence, we apply this method before
removing other sectors and firms from our sample. This is, we use the maximum sample available in ARD.
26Unfortunately, we can not implement the mark-up estimation method put forward by De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012), where mark-ups are derived from the first order condition of the gross output production function with
respect to a fully variable and competitive input (in our case, intermediate inputs, as labour is subject to imperfect
competition). As already mentioned before, estimating a gross output function consistent with our framework (that
is a nested CES, where the value added production function is one of the inputs, and materials is the other), proved
impossible.
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firms, as given by equation (6). However, the objective of the decomposition is to characterise
observed labour shares (in terms of observed value added and labour costs). Naturally, there will
be differences between these two. There are a multitude of reasons why predicted and observed
values can be different. For a start, in terms of our theory, firms’ optimisation process might
be more complex (e.g. dynamic rather than static), or firms might face constraints that lead to
misallocation of resources (i.e. firms are not efficient). There is substantial evidence in the literature
for this. Even if the theory is a good enough approximation to reality, discrepancies might arise
from imprecise or inconsistent estimates for the variables and parameters of the model (e.g. market
power, or TFP). Additionally, variables in the data could be measured with errors. Last but not
least, the stochastic nature of firms’ production means the latter is subject to idiosyncratic shocks
(e.g. productivity), which will always deviate the observed values from the predicted ones. This is
an irreducible source of theory-data mismatch, at least at the firm level.
The discrepancy between predicted and observed labour share introduces an extra term into the
decomposition.27 To see this, let us define τit ≡ λ
obs
it
λit
, which captures the divergence between the
observed and predicted labour share for firm i in period t, where the latter is given by equation (6).
Now, consider the following identity regarding the aggregate labour share (for notation economy,
time index is omitted throughout):
λobs ≡
∑
i
λobsi δ
obs
i
where δobsi =
piY
obs
i∑
piY obsi
. This is the empirical counterpart to the labour share definition in equation
(2). The connection between the model and data is done precisely through τi. This is, we can write:
λobs =
∑
i
λi τi δ
obs
i (13)
Replacing the predicted firm level labour share λi by its components (equation 6), and introducing
the counterfactual λHOM , produces:
λobs = λHOM
∑
i
(
χYi
χ¯Y
) 1
1−ρ ( χ¯L
χLi
) 1
1−ρ (Ai
A¯
) ρ
1−ρ
(
w¯
wi
) ρ
1−ρ
(
pi
p¯
) ρ
1−ρ (τi
τ¯
)
δobsi (14)
where
λHOM = τ¯
(
αχ¯Y
χ¯L
) 1
1−ρ ( A¯p¯
w¯
) ρ1−ρ
(15)
and τ¯ ≡∑i ωiτi, a weighted average of the discrepancy term. The introduction of τ¯ in the above
equation is useful because τi
τ¯
can be redefined as 1 + ∆τiτ¯ , which is similar in structure to the
second order Taylor approximation of the other terms inside the summation. This ensures the final
decomposition is defined in terms of correlations and coefficients of variation only, as was equation
(12) before.
27An approach where this term would not show up is when one of the variables of the model is not computed
using an optimality condition, but as a residual. For example, we could measure labour market power implicitly, as
the value that makes the rest of the measured variables fit that equation (e.g. as in Brummund, 2012). This however
confounds any “true” discrepancy with the measure of labour market power.
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With the above modification, and looking at the ratio w/p to further simplify the notation (this
has also the advantage to identify a real wage term in the expression for λHOM ), we obtain the
final “empirical” decomposition formula, used in the subsequent analysis:
λ ≈ λHOM
[
1 + ρ
2(1− ρ)2 CV
2(χY ) + 2− ρ
2(1− ρ)2 CV
2(χL) + ρ(2ρ− 1)
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(
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1− ρ r(A, τ)CV(A)CV(τ)−
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1− ρ r(
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p
, τ)CV
(
w
p
)
CV(τ)
]
(16)
The only difference with the theoretical counterpart is the addition of the last four terms, and
the introduction of τ¯ in λHOM . Notice that heterogeneity in τ itself does not affect the labour
share, unless it is correlated with other factors. Also, if the discrepancy is constant across firms (i.e.
CV(τ) = 0), there is no difference between the theoretical and empirical decomposition.
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5.1 Descriptive analysis of the labour share
Before proceeding with the decomposition, it is useful to describe the labour share in our sample.
Figure 2 presents different metrics for the latter, covering UK manufacturing, between 1998 and
2014. Starting with the aggregate labour share, we see a net fall over the period, from 0.58 in 1998
to 0.53 in 2014.29 It’s interesting to notice an initial period of increase in the labour share (peaking
at 0.61 in 2003), and a subsequent fall, with a minor interruption during the financial crisis. Figure
2 also presents the mean and median labour share, which are above the aggregate labour share,
highlighting that firms with higher value added (our measure of firm size) have a lower labour share.
This is consistent with other findings in the literature (e.g. Autor et al., 2017b; Schwellnus et al.,
2018).
Since the aggregate labour share is defined in terms of a weighted sum of firm level labour share
(equation 2), changes in the labour share can be due to changes in the magnitude of the firm level
labour shares, in the distribution of weights across different labour share levels, or both. Figure
28In order to produce standard errors for the estimated variables (e.g. TFP), we bootstrap the whole estimation
procedure (i.e. the imputation of capital, the estimation of the production function, and the decomposition), with
1,000 repetitions. Bootstrap is actually needed in order to compute the correct standard errors for the parameters of
the production function, given that capital is a generated regressor. To compute the confidence intervals presented in
this section we use the percentile method (e.g. see Efron and Tibshirani, 1986). This takes the point estimates as the
center of the interval, rather than the bootstrap average. Because of the non-linearities involved in the imputation
process, a bias might emerge when adding normally distributed variability to the estimations via bootstrap. In
practice, the two means have a correlation above 0.98, for every variable. The major discrepancy arises with the
mean of TFP, which is 14% higher in the bootstrap case. Trends are however the same.
29The labour share in manufacturing, computed from national accounts, shows an increase in the labour share
between 1998 and 2009, and a fall thereafter, with the 2014 level being roughly the same as that in 1998. The level
is also around 0.10 points higher in the national accounts. There is however no reason why they should be the same.
For instance, the sample used here focuses only on firms with more than 10 employees (with smaller firms tending to
have a higher labour share).
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Figure 2: Aggregate, mean and median labour share
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Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more, ARD data.
Note: 95% confidence intervals are displayed as a shadowed area.
2 already shows a fall in the average labour share. Another perspective is seen in Panel (a) of
Figure 3, which shows that the sample distribution of firms’ labour share in 2014 has more mass at
lower labour share levels than in 1998. Similarly, Panel (b) captures the distribution of value added
across different labour share levels, showing that in 2014 more value added was produced by firms
with lower labour share than in 1998.30
Changes in Panel (b) however might merely be reflecting changes in Panel (a), i.e. the fact that
there are more firms at lower labour share levels. To identify the effect of changes in the composition
of weights on the aggregate labour share, we compute the ratio between the average and aggregate
labour share. This ratio is a measure of the covariance between λi and δi. In particular, when this
ratio is one, these two variables are perfectly orthogonal; unweighted and weighted labour share
are the same. Conversely, the higher the ratio, the more negative this covariance is.31 As said
earlier, smaller firms have higher labour share, so this covariance is negative. Figure 4 presents
the evolution of this ratio. There is no obvious trend in this variable, suggesting that most of the
change in the aggregate labour share is due to the fall in the level of the labour share across the
firm size spectrum. One way to confirm this is by a simple counterfactual exercise, where we either
keep the distribution of the labour share (Panel (a) in Figure 3) or the distribution of value added
(Panel (b) in same figure) to its value in 1998, and measure the counterfactual aggregate labour
share in 2014. This exercise reveals that changes in the distribution of value added has a minor
impact on the aggregate labour share; it’s the change in the level of the labour share that matters
the most.
30Notice the labour share is always positive, because the (few) observations with negative value added are removed
from the sample (as they cannot be used in the estimation of the production function).
31The mathematical characterisation of this ratio is presented in Appendix B.
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Figure 3: Histograms related to changes in the labour share, 1998 and 2014
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Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more.
Figure 4: Ratio between average and aggregate labour share
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Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more.
Note: 95% confidence intervals are displayed as a shadowed area.
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Figure 5: Dispersion in the labour share
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Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more.
Note: 95% confidence intervals are displayed as a shadowed area.
Figure 6: Decomposition of the aggregate labour share
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Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more.
Note: 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals are displayed as a shadowed area.
Importantly, as Panel (a) in Figure 3 shows, the fall in the level of the labour share has not been
an homogeneous phenomenon. In effect, the upper tail of the distribution barely changed between
the two years. This reflects an increase in the dispersion of the labour share. Figure 5 documents
this change, computed either as a coefficient of variation or a p90/p10 ratio. Dispersion changed
particularly after 2003. There seems to be, actually, a relatively strong inverse relation between the
aggregate labour share and the dispersion of firm level labour share (correlation of -0.70 or higher).
5.2 Decomposition of the aggregate labour share
Equation (14) decomposes the aggregate labour share in terms of λHOM (i.e. the labour share
of a counterfactual “representative” firm) and
∑
(i.e. a quantification of firms’ multidimensional
dispersion with respect to that counterfactual firm). The decomposition for the manufacturing
sector as a whole is depicted in Figure 6 (see Appendix E for an equivalent analysis at the subsector
level).
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Two things are important to notice. First, the level of the aggregate labour share is significantly
different when compared with the counterfactual homogeneous firm. This is, if all firms were
identical, the labour share would be significantly smaller. This result supports the theoretical result
of the paper, and echoes the result in the example presented in Figure 1, namely that heterogeneity
matters. Second, as Panel (b) shows, the role of heterogeneity has been relatively stable over the
period. This is, changes in firm heterogeneity has not been a major driver of the movements of the
aggregate labour share observed over the period. Importantly, this does not mean firm heterogeneity
has not changed. As shown later, changes have partly offsetted each other.
To quantify the role of firm heterogeneity vis-a-vis that of λHOM in movements of λobs, we carry out
a simple growth accounting decomposition of the equation λobs = λHOM
∑
. Such decomposition is
given by
gλobs = gλHOM + g∑ + interaction effect
where gZ stands for the growth rate of factor Z, over a given period. Table 1 presents the result
of this exercise for two sub-periods, using 2003 (the year that the labour share reached it highest
level) as threshold, as well as for the entire period. In all cases we see that the bulk of the change
in the labour share has been due to λHOM . Meanwhile,
∑
has partly counteracted the effect of
the former, by around 20%.
Table 1: Contribution to change in aggregate labour share (λobs), different periods
Period λobs λHOM
∑
Interaction
1998-2003 6.16% 7.62% -1.36% -0.10%
2003-2014 -12.57% -15.43% 3.38% -0.52%
1998-2014 -7.18% -8.98% 1.98% -0.18%
Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more.
5.3 Decomposition of the labour share of the representative firm
The homogeneous labour share, which formula is given by equation (15), can be further analysed
by looking at its constituent elements. Figure 7 presents the evolution of the different variables for
the whole manufacturing sector (again, see Appendix E for a subsector level analysis).32 Recall
that these represent weighted averages of the sector’s firms. Panel (a) shows a fairly unstable but
overall increase in TFP over the period (trend interrupted by a 2008-9 dip). Real wages (Panel b)
show a stable pre-2008 growth, with a subsequent dip (particularly in 2009). Interestingly, such
growth rate has slowed down post-2008, a trend consistent with ONS aggregate data. Product
market power (Panel c) has increased over the period (recall lower χY means more product market
power), albeit also not in a steady fashion.33 Labour market power (Panel d) fell in the early years
32 2007 presents an unusual behaviour, with significantly more more missing observations in the original dataset,
particularly for small firms. This selection means weighted averages are exaggerated. This can be seen in the graphs
by particularly high values for productivity, real wages and labour market power. For instance, it looks like the Great
Recession hit in 2008, whereas it did so towards the end of that year, and particularly in 2009 (visible in the graphs).
33De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) also document a mild increase in mark-ups for the UK, although with a different
timing than the one described here. However, the difference between their method and ours are major. They do
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of the period, and subsequently increased post-2008 (recall lower χL means less less market power
for the firm). The sharp rise in 2007 is artificial (see footnote 32). Lastly, the discrepancy term τ¯
(Panel e) is fairly stable, meaning this is unlikely to drive any of the results.34
Table 2 presents the growth rates of each variable in Figure 7, over the subperiods of interest. As
equation (15) indicates, the effect of these variables on λHOM is mediated by ρ. In order to see the
final effect of each of these variables on λHOM , we carry out a growth accounting decomposition of
equation (15). This decomposition is given by
gλHOM =
(
ρ
1− ρ
)
gA¯ −
(
ρ
1− ρ
)
gw¯/p¯ +
(
1
1− ρ
)
gχ¯Y −
(
1
1− ρ
)
gχ¯L + gτ¯ + interaction effect
Table 2: Change in λHOM components
Period gA¯ gw¯/p¯ gχ¯Y gχ¯L gτ¯
1998-2003 8.69% 16.63% 1.45% -4.26% 0.91%
2003-2014 35.30% 13.96% -4.86% 7.86% -1.81%
1998-2014 47.06% 32.91% -3.48% 3.27% -0.91%
Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more.
Table 3 shows the resulting contribution of each component of λHOM . It can be seen that real
wages did not grow as fast as productivity did, and the gap between the two can explain most of
the actual change in λHOM . In particular, we see that the pay-productivity disconnect is the key
driver in both sub-periods. Given that the second sub-period is longer, and what was observed
previously regarding the slower growth in real wages post recession, part of the blame is on the
latter. In fact, if we impose the same annual growth rate of real wages observed between 1998 and
2003 (3.1%) for the post-crisis period, no pay-productivity disconnect would have emerged over the
period, virtually muting any change in λHOM , ceteris paribus.
Table 3 also indicates that market power both contributed to an overall fall in the labour share. As
commented earlier in relation to Figure 7, there is a marked different behaviour of market power
within the whole period. This is also seen in the Table. Between 1998 and 2003, both product and
labour market power fell (reflected in higher and lower χ¯Y and χ¯L, respectively). This reversed in
the second sub-period. And the latter changes dominated. Thus, we can see an overall increase in
not use micro-data but balance-sheet data, covering sectors beyond manufacturing; they assume a Cobb-Douglas
gross output production function; and they use sales rather than value added to compute national level averages. A
similar method and data to the latter is applied by Haldane et al. (2018), who report an increase in mark-ups in UK
manufacturing, starting around 2005.
34At first, the level of τ¯ might appear to be relatively high. Recall this is computed as the ratio between the
observed and predicted labour share across firms. Thus, τ¯ around two suggests predicted λi is around half of the
observed labour share. This is however not necessarily true. As Appendix D shows, Aˆit contains both the shock to
TFP and the shock to value added (terms ξit and it in equations (23) and (24), respectively). While the latter
has zero mean in terms of the logarithm of value added (again, see equation 23), it does not do so around value
added itself. This bias is captured by the level of Aˆit (bias that should be constant as long as the variance of it is
constant). It can be shown that E(Aˆit|Φt) = Aite
σ2
2 , where σ2 is the variance of it. The magnitude of such bias
is unknown because the two shocks cannot be empirically identified, and thus σ2 cannot be estimated. The sign
however is evidently positive; TFP is overestimated. Furthermore, since the predicted labour share (equation 6)
contains Aˆit to the power of ρ1−ρ , and ρ is estimated to be -1.07, such bias is lowering the predicted labour share,
which in turns raises τi and therefore τ¯ . Again, as long as σ2 is constant over time, such bias is only a level effect,
without affecting trends and therefore the decomposition exercise.
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Figure 7: Evolution of different elements of λHOM
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Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more.
Note: 95% confidence intervals are displayed as a shadowed area (except for real wages, which are observed).
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Table 3: Contribution to changes in λHOM
Period λHOM A¯ w¯/p¯ χ¯Y χ¯L τ¯ Interaction
1998-2003 7.62% -4.49% 8.59% -0.70% 2.06% 0.91% -0.15%
2003-2014 -15.43% -18.25% 7.22% -2.35% -3.80% -1.81% 3.55%
1998-2014 -8.98% -24.33% 17.01% -1.68% -1.58% -0.91% 2.51%
Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more.
Figure 8: Coefficient of variation of each dimension of firm heterogeneity
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Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more, ARD data.
product and labour market power of firms by 2014, jointly pushing for a 3.20% fall in the labour
share. Yet, as said earlier, since the model offers a partial equilibrium approach, the total effects
cannot be fully disentangled. In fact, one of the factors driving the slowdown in wage growth could
well be the higher labour market power of firms. This, combined with higher rents enabled by more
product market power, can help explain the the subsequent fall in the labour share.
5.4 Firms’ heterogeneity
The last decomposition exercise focuses on the heterogeneity component,
∑
. As equation (16)
shows, this is a function of the coefficient of variation and the correlation among variables (this is,
the structure of the joint distribution of heterogeneity). Before carrying out this decomposition, it
is then interesting to evaluate these elements.
Figure 8 characterises firm heterogeneity in the five different dimensions under study, measured by
their coefficient of variation —which, being dimensionless, can be compared across variables. In
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terms of levels, TFP and labour market power have the highest variation across firms. (Deflated)
wages are somewhere in the middle, with product market power and the “discrepancy” component
having the lowest variability across firms. It should not be surprising that TFP varies more than
wages, given that the latter is a much more “structural” process, driven by market trends relatively
common across firms, and regulated by legal contracts; conversely, TFP might be quite idiosyncratic
to the firm’s conditions, slow to reproduce elsewhere. What’s more interesting is the relatively
high variability of labour market power vis-a-vis that of product market power. The logic might
be the same though. Product market power is computed in terms of mark-ups, which depend on
the prices of final goods and variable inputs. Prices adjust easily and they move based on fairly
common trends. Conversely, labour market power (calculated as local labour market shares) reflect
the spatial heterogeneity of firms, with all the geographical idiosyncrasies involved. Spatial mobility
of firms is a slow process. Finally, it is good news that the term describing the mismatch between
the data and the theory has relatively low variability. In terms of changes of heterogeneity over
time, there are no major movements, excepting TFP and real wages, both moving towards less
heterogeneity.
The second important element of firm heterogeneity refers to the correlation among variables across
firms over time, presented in Figure 9. Most of them are fairly close to zero. Noticeable exceptions
are the positive correlation between TFP and real wages and the negative correlation between
product market power and TFP (suggesting that firms with higher TFP have higher product
market product). The other very high correlation is between labour market power and τi, perhaps
suggesting measurement errors associated with the former. Interestingly, product market power is
virtually uncorrelated with real wages, reflecting perhaps a low bargaining power of workers, as
they are unable to capture rents by firms. As commented earlier, this might be part of the reason
the labour share fell over the period. Regarding changes of these correlations over time, the most
noticeable changes are those of labour market power with TFP and real wages, both increasing,
albeit remaining below 0.40 in 2014. Most of the rest remain fairly stable.
Having provided some background evidence regarding the structure of the joint distribution of firms’
characteristics, we can now proceed to the decomposition of
∑
, which Table 1 above suggested had
a minor role in the observed labour share. Two issues are of particular interest here. First, which
are the most relevant sources of firm heterogeneity? Second, how have these sources changed over
time? Figure 10 helps answering these two questions by presenting the evolution of the different
components of
∑
. The graph is a stacked area plot, meaning the sum of all terms (or equivalently,
the difference between the positive and negative totals), yields
∑
. For ease of visualisation,
∑
is
centered around zero, whereas, as equation (16) shows, this moves around one.
What this figure shows is that the bulk of the effect of firm heterogeneity on the aggregate labour
share is due to two elements, namely TFP and labour market power. Figure 8 has already shown
these are the dimensions with the highest variability. Figure 10 shows that they also have the
biggest impact on the labour share, taking into account the effect of the the elasticity of substitution
parameter ρ. Variability in the real wage is of second order of importance (and its effect goes in
the other direction), whereas variability in product market power is completely irrelevant (its value
averages -0.006 over the period), as it is that of τi, which in itself does not affect λ (see equation 16).
In terms of correlations, the size of the effect again mimics those seen in Figure 9. The correlation
of TFP with deflated wages, and labour market power with τi are the most significant, followed
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Figure 9: Evolution of correlation among different dimensions of firm heterogeneity
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Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more, ARD data.
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Figure 10: Stacked area plot showing the decomposition of
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not listed in the plot. It also considers all higher order terms not
part of the approximation. Adding up all positive and negative terms yields
∑
.
Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more.
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by that of TFP with both product and labour market power. Recall the latter correlation is not
significantly high, but its combination with CV(χL) and CV(A) (both high), pushed the effect up.
It is worth point it out that the terms not explicitly mentioned in the decomposition (included in
“Other terms”) are mostly irrelevant for the labour share. Crucially, this component includes every
other term excluded from the approximation in equation (16), and therefore, acts as an empirical
test for the validity of the decomposition. It is therefore revealing to see that our approximation is
sufficient for capturing the bulk of the changes in
∑
. Naturally, it is impossible to extrapolate this
conclusion to every empirical application of the method, but it is our suspicion the method is in
general good enough for its purpose.
To conclude this section, we can see what type of heterogeneity matters the most for the aggregate
labour share (TFP and χLi ), what matters the least (χYi and τi), and what matters in between
(wages and prices). Naturally, TFP and labour market power are grounded in idiosyncratic processes
(e.g. organisational knowledge specific to the firm, or geographical amenities, respectively), more
difficult to arbitrate across firms, and therefore with higher and more persistent heterogeneity.
Conversely, prices are particularly mobile, meaning less variation and persistence of such variation
across firms. Luckily for our analysis, the term capturing the discrepancy between the data and
our theory is a highly irrelevant driver of the results.
6 Conclusions
This paper presented a novel approach to study the aggregate labour share. The method is based on
a simple, yet powerful enough model of firm behaviour, which allows for a detailed decomposition
of the aggregate labour share in terms of different dimensions of firm heterogeneity (TFP, real
wages and product and labour market power). The method characterises the aggregate economy by
means of a weighted average firm (also called a “counterfactual” firm), and quantifies heterogeneity
with respect to such average. The main theoretical result presents the conditions under which firm
heterogeneity affects the labour share. The role of the joint distribution of firm-level variables is
captured in the decomposition formula in terms of the coefficient of variation for each variable and
the correlation among variables. Importantly, the paper shows that firm heterogeneity matters
in ways that are invisible when using models based on an aggregate production function. In this
sense, our model provides a bridge between the micro and the macro approach to the analysis of
the labour share.
To prove the value of the method, we apply the decomposition to a firm level dataset from the UK
manufacturing sector, covering the 1998-2014 period. Descriptively speaking, the data indicates
that the aggregate labour shares fell around 7% over the period, something that seems related
mostly to a generalised fall in the firm level labour share across the firm size spectrum. Albeit
the distribution of the labour share moved towards the left (hence the overall fall), the upper tail
remained stable, implying an increase in the dispersion of the labour share.
The main decomposition exercise produces two results. First, firm heterogeneity contributes
significantly to the aggregate labour share. In effect, the weighted average labour share is around
ten points lower than the aggregate labour share. Second, most of the 7% fall in the aggregate
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labour share can be accounted for changes in the weighted average labour share. In other words,
the effect of firm heterogeneity on the aggregate labour share is roughly constant over the period.
Then, we provide further insights on the drivers of the observed fall in the weighted average labour
share. We show that the pay-productivity gap widened over the period (and particularly after
2003), which alone can explain most of the change in the weighted average labour share. Firm
market power (in the product and labour market) grew somewhat over the period too (particularly
after the Great Recession), also contributing to the lower labour share.
Lastly, we look deeper into the factors that produce the wedge between the weighted average labour
share and the aggregate labour share. This is, we look at what type of heterogeneity matters. The
analysis reveals that TFP and labour market power are the two key sources of heterogeneity driving
the wedge. The least relevant dimension is product market power heterogeneity (which is fairly
low), with wages and price dispersion somewhere in between. This result seems intuitive enough.
TFP and labour market power reflect phenomena which are much more difficult to arbitrate across
space and time (e.g. because of some organisational knowledge specific to the firm, or the reduced
mobility of workers across space). Conversely, product market power and real wages are rooted in
prices, which by definition can adjust much quicker across space and time. Different degrees of
persistence matter.
Some issues remain to be solved. In particular, even though our analysis benefits from relatively low
degrees of (bi-variate) correlation across variables, our approach is still that of partial equilibrium.
To get a more fundamental grasp of the deep drivers of our results, we need to move towards a
general equilibrium setting, which we expect to do in future research.
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A Alternative production functions and the aggregate la-
bour share
The assumption of a constant returns to scale CES value added production function with homo-
geneous parameters is not arbitrary, but chosen for necessity and parsimony. To see this, consider
the consequences for the decomposition formula of alternative assumptions. First, let us recall our
main assumptions. The production function is
Yi = Ai (αLρi + (1− α)Kρi )
1
ρ
This implies the firm level labour share is
λi =
(
αχYi
χLi
) 1
1−ρ (Aipi
wi
) ρ
1−ρ
and the aggregate labour share is
λ =
∑
i
(
αχYi
χLi
) 1
1−ρ (Aipi
wi
) ρ
1−ρ
δi
In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function (i.e. when ρ = 0), the latter is given by
λ =
∑
i
(
αχYi
χLi
)
δi
Thus, there is no explicit role for productivity and real wages (and thus for the pay productivity
disconnect) in the aggregate labour share; only market power affects the latter. This result holds
even if there are non constant returns to scale.
Regarding the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS) for the general CES, this is necessary
for a decomposition to be possible. In effect, for a CES like the following:
Yi = Ai (αLρi + (1− α)Kρi )
ν
ρ
it can be shown that the firm level labour share is
λi =
(
ανχYi
χLi
) ν
ν−ρ (Aipi
wi
) ρ
ν−ρ
L
ρ(ν−1)
ν−ρ
i
This is, the labour share depends on the actual level of employment (except, of course, under CRS).
To be consistent with our framework, where we replace value added and employment by their
optimal values in terms of TFP, wages, prices and market power, we need to replace Li above with
its solution in terms of these same variables. This solution is a highly non-linear function, obtained
from the combination of the FOC of profits with respect to labour and capital. The final expression
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for the firm’s labour share is then not a neat, multiplicative function of each variable, and thus it is
not possible to decompose using our method.
What if technologies are heterogeneous? If α varies across firms, it is still possible to achieve a
clear decomposition. In one sense, α is like any other variable inside λ. It would be possible to
compute a counterfactual α¯ and add it to λHOM . The problem is empirical. The model is already
too complicated for it to be estimated, and adding non-linear firm specific parameters would not
improve things (see equation 25 in Appendix D). Meanwhile, heterogeneity in ρ denies the possibility
to arrive at a decomposition formula altogether. More precisely, there is no way to write terms like
Ai
A¯
and separate λ into a counterfactual firm and dispersion with respect to it, as in equation (8).
One might also question the use of a value added production function as a starting point, rather
than, for instance, a CES gross output production function. To see this, consider such a function:
Qi = Bi (αLγi + βM
γ
i + (1− α− β)Kγi )
1
γ (17)
where Qi is gross output and Mi is intermediary inputs. The first order condition with respect to
Li is:
∂Qi
∂Li
≡ αBγi (Qi)1−γ(Li)γ−1 =
(
wi
pi
)
χLi
χYi
From here, we obtain a formula for optimal QiLi , given by:
Qi
Li
=
(
wiχ
L
i
αBγi piχ
Y
i
) 1
1−γ
Repeating for intermediary inputs, we obtain:
Qi
Mi
=
(
pMi
βBγi piχ
Y
i
) 1
1−γ
where pMi is the price of intermediary inputs. Now, the labour share for the firm is given by:
λi ≡ wiLi
piQi − pMi Mi
= wi
pi
Qi
Li
− pMi MiLi
where nominal value added is defined as piQi − pMi Mi. Combining the above results, it is possible
to show that λi is:
λi =
(
α
χLi
) 1
1−γ w
γ
1−γ
i
(βpi)
γ
γ−1
(
χYi
) 1
γ−1 − β 11−γ (pMi ) γγ−1
It is evident that the above is unhelpful in achieving a decomposition of the aggregate labour share,
not even in the special cases of a Cobb-Douglas or Leontief gross output production function (γ = 0
or γ = −∞, respectively). An alternative is to specify the production function in equation (17) as
a nested CES, as follows:
Qi = Bi (bYiγ + (1− b)Miγ)
1
γ (18)
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where Yi = Ai (αLρi + (1− α)Kρi )
1
ρ , this is, a CES of labour and capital. Bruno (1978) shows
that, if this gross output production function is either linear or Leontief (i.e. γ = −∞ or γ = 1),
Yi corresponds to real value added (where both output and inputs are deflated). In other words,
Yi = f(Li,Ki) is a value added production function. Such is the implicit assumption in our model,
one which unfortunately cannot be tested, due to the complexity of applying the dynamic panel
method (or the control function method) to the production function in equation (18).
It must be noted here that, albeit it is tempting to estimate equation (18) using value added directly
as an input in equation (18) (rather than the nested CES with capital, labour and intermediary
inputs) this is spurious. Value added is defined as gross output minor intermediary inputs (properly
deflated). Estimating such equation will produce (and does produce, in our data) Bˆi ≈ 1, bˆ ≈ 0.5
and γˆ ≈ 1. The latter might suggest the conditions for the existence of a value added production
function set out in Bruno (1978) are met. Yet, the problem with this approach is that when using
value added as an input, the existence of such production function is actually imposed in the
equation. In effect, replacing the estimates given above into equation (18) leads to Qi ≈ Yi −Mi,
which is the identity for the definition of real value added. In other words, we are merely estimating
an identity.
B Statistical decomposition
The aggregate labour share is defined as a weighted average of firms’ labour share:
λobs =
∑
i
δiλi
where δi is the total economy’s share of value added of firm i. As the sample size grows, sample
moments converge to population moments (ultimately, if we were to have a census of all firms, the
two would be the same, provided no other issues like measurement errors exist). One such moment
is E(δλ), for which the Law of Large Numbers states that
lim
N→∞
λobs
N
= E(δλ)
Using the formulas from the covariance, and replacing population moments with sample equivalent,
it is trivial to show that
λobs = Eˆ(λ) +N Cˆov(δ, λ) (19)
where Eˆ(λ) is the observed unweighted average labour share. Therefore, the unweighted over the
weighted average labour share is:
Eˆ(λ)
λobs
= 1−N Cˆov(δ, λ)
λobs
(20)
This ratio is greater the more negative the covariance between firm size and labour share is, ceteris
paribus.
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C Effects of changes at one specific firm
C.1 Effects on the firm level labour share
How the firm level labour share reacts to changes in prices, wages, technology, market power and
capital depends on ρ. By taking the partial derivative of (6) with respect to each variable, it is
immediate to identify the effects of the different (firm level) variables, which are summarised in
Tables A1 and A2, for ρ < 0 and ρ > 0 respectively. For simplicity, the two forms of market power
are combined in one term, with χi = χ
L
i
χY
i
.
Table A1: Determinants of the firm level labour share, ρ < 0.
Sign of the effect
λ′i(Ai) –
λ′i(Ki) 0
λ′i(wi) originated by a change in ΘLi +
λ′i(pi) originated by a change in ΘYi –
λ′i(χi) direct effect –
λ′i(χi) indirect effect through prices –
λ′i(χi) indirect effect through wages –
λ′i(χi) overall effect –
Table A2: Determinants of the firm level labour share, ρ > 0.
Sign of the effect
λ′i(Ai) +
λ′i(Ki) 0
λ′i(wi) originated by a change in ΘLi –
λ′i(pi) originated by a change in ΘYi +
λ′i(χi) direct effect –
λ′i(χi) indirect effect through prices +
λ′i(χi) indirect effect through wages +
λ′i(χi) overall effect ?
Note that when analysing the ceteris paribus effects of a change in wages or output price on λi,
we are assuming that they were originated by a change in the idiosyncratic preference parameters
ΘLi and ΘYi , and not in a change in market power χi. Market power, on the other hand, has two
effects: a direct effect, and an indirect effect through prices and wages. The direct effect of market
power on the labour share is negative (see the first term of equation 6). Said differently, a lower
|ηYi | or ηLi , which are equivalent to a higher market power χi for the firm, translate into a lower
labour share. When ρ < 0, the indirect effect goes in the same direction, so that the overall effect
of market power is unambiguously negative. Note also that the amount of capital employed, given
the CRS assumption, does not affect λi.
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Table A1 or variants obtained with different theoretical assumptions informed most of the micro-
econometric investigations on the determinants of the firm-level LS.
C.2 Effects on the aggregate labour share
The effects of a variation in one firm level variable on the aggregate labour share, keeping all other
firms unchanged, depend among other things on whether the firm considered has an above-average
or below-average labour share. Recall that the aggregate labour share is a weighted average of the
individual labour shares (equation 2), and write it as
λ = λJ(1− δi) + λiδi (2′)
where λJ =
∑
j 6=i λj
1−δj
1−δi is the average labour share excluding firm i.
The change in the aggregate labour share following from changes in the production plans at firm i
is therefore given by:
λ′(·) = (λi − λJ)δ′i(·) + λ′i(·)δi (21)
The direction of change in λ depends therefore on (i) how the labour share changes at firm i, (ii)
how the relative weight of firm i changes, and (iii) whether the labour share at firm i is above or
below the average.
Note that equation (21) does not depend on firm i having the same production function (e.g the
same α and ρ) of any other firm j. What originates the change in λ is simply a change in λi
for a given firm i, and a change in the weight of that individual firm in the whole economy: no
changes occur to any other firm, so how the labour share is determined in those other firms does
not matter. These simple results provide the basics for understanding the effects of simultaneous
changes taking places at different firms. Each change in firm level variables pulls in a direction as
identified by Table A1 and A2, and the overall effect is nothing else than a simple composition of
all these individual effects.
We know from Tables A1 and A2 how λi reacts to changes in firm level variables. As for what
concerns the weights, these depend, keeping all other firms fixed, on the value added of firm i. From
equation (3) we know that value added Yi grows with Ai, Li and Ki, while it is easy to show from
equation (4) that employment at firm i expands as productivity Ai, prices pi (keeping market power
constant) and capital Ki increase, and contracts as wages wi (keeping market power constant), and
market power χi (keeping wages fixed) increase. Putting all this together, by the envelop theorem
we get that the relative weight of firm i in the economy increases with Ai, Ki and pi, and decreases
with wi, keeping market power constant.
The latter has an ambiguous effect on market share. When ρ < 0, the partial derivative of Ωi with
respect to χi is negative: the direct effect of market power is thus to reduce market share. However,
an increase in market power originates either from a decrease in |ηYi | (output is more rigid) or from
a decrease in ηLi (labour supply is more rigid), translating either into a higher price or into lower
wages. Both increase production and hence market share, counteracting the negative direct effect.
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The overall effects of changes in the characteristics of one firm on the aggregate labour share are
reported in Tables A3 and A4, for ρ < 0 and ρ > 0 respectively.
Table A3: Effects of changes in the characteristics of one firm on the aggregate labour share, ρ < 0.
δ′i λ
′
i
λ′
λi > λJ λi < λJ
Ai + – ? –
Ki + 0 + –
wi originated by a change in ΘLi – + ? +
pi originated by a change in ΘYi + – ? –
χi direct + indirect effect ? ? ? ?
Table A4: Effects of changes in the characteristics of one firm on the aggregate labour share, ρ > 0.
δ′i λ
′
i
λ′
λi > λJ λi < λJ
Ai + + + ?
Ki + 0 + –
wi originated by a change in ΘLi – – – ?
pi originated by a change in ΘYi + + + ?
χi direct + indirect effect ? ? ? ?
D Estimation of value added production function
As said in the main text, TFP and the production function parameters are not observed in the data.
We draw from the abundant literature on estimating production functions in order to compute
these missing terms.
The point of departure in this analysis is the fact that Ait is not observed by the econometrician, but
might be observed by firms. Thus, if firms choose inputs based on their productivity level, a simple
estimation of TFP using least squares would suffer from endogeneity. Since the seminal paper by
Olley and Pakes (1996), several techniques have been put forward to address the endogeneity problem
that might exist when estimation productivity using micro data.35 Here we follow the dynamic
panel approach (e.g. Blundell and Bond, 2000), where endogeneity is eliminated by assuming TFP
follows an AR(1) process with parameter θ, and then the main model is θ-differentiated. The
dynamic panel approach has some advantages with respect to other methods, including less stringent
data requirement, expanding the sample size.36 In short, the method works as follows. We start
35For a survey, see Ackerberg et al. (2007).
36Another common approach is the control function method, based on Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003). This semi-parametric method is based on stronger assumptions and requires greater data availability
than the dynamic panel approach. The latter is the case because the control function method relies on past values
of investment (in the case of Olley and Pakes, 1996), or intermediary inputs (in the case of Levinsohn and Petrin,
2003) as instruments, which in our sample are only available when a firm is selected for the survey (say, in period
t). Conversely, we can implement the dynamic panel approach using past values of employment and capital as
instruments, without need for investment or intermediary inputs. ARD has a companion dataset with the universe
of firms for all years, including minimal data like employment (dataset built from administrative tax registry data).
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with our production function, extended to an econometric notation:
Yit = eωit (αLρit + (1− α)Kρit)
1
ρ eit (22)
where for convenience we have defined Ait ≡ eωit , and where it is a idiosyncratic iid shock to
output. As the rest of the literature, we assume ωit follows a first-order Markov process. This is,
ωit = E [ωit|ωit−1] + ξit, where ξit is an idiosyncratic iid shock to productivity, known to the firm.
Taking logs of (22), we get:
yit =
1
ρ
ln (αLρit + (1− α)Kρit) + ωit + it (23)
The common assumption in the literature about the informational setting is that capital is a state
variable (in the sense that it is chosen in period t− 1), whereas labour is a flexible factor (in the
sense that it can be chosen in period t). This informational structure is relevant because under
the assumption that a firm knows its shock to productivity (ξit), labour is correlated with the
unobserved (by the econometrician) error term, and hence endogenous in equation (23). Non-linear
least squares would then yield inconsistent results.
To move further, we align with the literature by assuming ωit follows an AR(1):
ωit = θωit−1 + ξit (24)
If we combine equations (22) and (24) (i.e. if we “θ-differentiate” the production function), we get:
yit =
1
ρ
ln (αLρit + (1− α)Kρit)+θ
[
yit−1 − 1
ρ
ln
(
αLρit−1 + (1− α)Kρit−1
)]
+ξit+(it−θit−1) (25)
Thus, “θ-differencing” the model eliminates unobserved productivity from the equation. The above
can then be estimated using GMM.
It is important to notice here that the above model is highly non-linear. In effect, most of
the literature estimates Cobb-Douglas production functions, which are log-linear in parameters.
Unfortunately, in our data GMM does not converge. Hence, in practice, we estimate a translog
production function, which is an approximation of the CES around an elasticity of substitution
equal to 1.37 This production function is:
yit ≈ ln(Ait)+α ln(Lit) + (1− α) ln(Kit) + ρα(1− α)2 ln
2(Lit)
−ρα(1− α) ln(Lit) ln(Kit) + ρα(1− α)2 ln
2(Kit) + µit
Similarly, using the perpetual inventory method, we can compute capital in t − 1 for every firm sampled in t.
Therefore, we are able to extend the sample with past values of the key instruments, thereby expanding the sample
size. In any case, for comparative purposes, we also estimated the production function with the control function
approach, using intermediate inputs as proxy. Unfortunately, it yielded invalid results (in terms of parameter outside
the theoretical domain).
37As commented earlier, Monte Carlo simulations in Lagomarsino (2017) show that the non-linear translog used
here is a very good approximation of the underlying CES, for ρ close to or below 1, as it is our case (see end of
appendix).
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The final model estimated by GMM is obtained by “θ-differencing” the equation above, with instru-
ments {ln(Kit), ln2(Kit), ln(Kit−1), ln2(Kit−1), ln(Lit−1), ln2(Lit−1), ln(Lit−1) ln(Kit−1)}. Estima-
tion produces the following values, all significant at the 1%:38 αˆ = 0.50, ρˆ = −1.07, θˆ = 0.92, and a
constant of 3.8.
Finally, having estimated α and ρ, we can use equation (22) to compute Aˆit as a residual, for every
firm and period. Importantly, since the productivity shock (ξit) cannot be identified separately
from the idiosyncratic shock to value added (it), Aˆit also includes the realised shock to value
added, ˆit. In effect, from equation (22) we can see that Aˆit = ec+ωˆit+ˆit (where c is the constant
term in the regression). This means that Aˆit is a biased predictor of Ait. Nevertheless, as long as
the variance of it is constant over time, such bias is constant too, not affecting the decomposition,
which focuses on changes over time.39 Notice equation (22) allows us to compute the “realised”
value of A even for observations not part of the regression sample (for example, because of missing
data in a given year). We follow this approach, and “extrapolate” Aˆit whenever possible. Around
50% of final observations used in the analysis are extrapolated.
Capital stock
Having outlined the estimation procedure for the production function, we should mention that
firm-level capital stock is not available in the dataset. Nonetheless, firms report information on
their capital expenditures (investment) for a variety of assets like buildings, vehicles, and so on.
One method often used to compute capital at the firm level is the perpetual inventory method.
Whilst this is a good approximation for firms that are observed to be born during the sample period
(i.e. for those which are sampled during their first year of existence), for firms that do not (in our
sample, 99.99% of firms), the level of capital may be greatly underestimated with such method.
Instead, we follow the strategy proposed by Chen and Plotnikova (2014), which estimates capital
at the firm level using the aggregate level of capital stocks in the manufacturing sector (obtained
from the Office for National Statistics). First, we select a few “proxy” variables, which are likely
to be positively correlated with unobserved firm-level capital, and are observed both at the firm
and at the aggregate level. We use intermediate inputs and employment. Then, we estimate the
“structural relationship” between these proxies and capital (based on an assumed stability of their
joint distribution).40 This relationship is given by the following formula:
Kit =
(
Lit
Lt
)a(
Mit
Mt
)1−a
Kt (26)
where Lt, Mt, and Kt represent the observed values of employment, intermediate inputs and capital
in the whole of manufacturing sector in year t; parameter a accounts for the relative importance of
each proxy in the structural relationship. This parameter is assumed constant over time.
38Since capital is a generated regressors (see next subsection), standard errors are based on bootstrap estimates,
with 1000 replications.
39See footnote 34 for further details.
40In principle, this relationship is not testable, since we lack capital data at the firm level. However, the correlation
between capital estimated with this method and the perpetual inventory method, for firms observed to be born
in the sample period, is 0.56. This is a significantly high correlation, considering that new firms are likely to be
significantly different that established firms, e.g. in terms of their investment patters.
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In practice, a is unknown. Furthermore, this cannot be estimated from equation (26), since Kit is
also unknown. The solution is to combine equation (26) with that of capital accumulation, namely
Kit = (1− δ)Kit−1 + Iit, where Iit is firm level investment (available in the dataset), and d is the
depreciation rate of the capital stock in manufacturing. This leads to the following equation:
Iit =
(
Lit
Lt
)a(
Mit
Mt
)1−a
Kt − (1− δ)
(
Lit−1
Lt−1
)a(
Mit−1
Mt−1
)1−a
Kt−1 (27)
The above can be estimated using GMM. Results for the whole manufacturing sector yield aˆ = 0.42,
significant at 1%.41 With this value is then possible to impute capital at the firm level using
equation (26). Notice this imputation allows for extrapolation from the estimation sample to firms
which are not observed in consecutive years (condition required by the regression), or which are
sampled only in one year. The extrapolation is valid as long as the “structural relationship” does
not depend on properties of the sample selection (for instance, firm size).
E Decomposition results for manufacturing subsectors
The main text presented the decomposition analysis for the whole manufacturing sector. Here, we
repeat the main exercise for manufacturing subsectors, defined as 2 digit SIC07 (divisions). Instead
of assuming a common production function across subsectors, we estimate the (translog) production
function for each division separately.
Unfortunately, only 13 out of 23 subsectors produced meaningful results (in terms of parameters
within the theoretical boundaries), suggesting not every subsector might be represented by a
CES/translog production function.42 Overall, the 13 subsectors cover 62% of the total observations
(firm-years) available the manufacturing sector, and used in the main text.
Table A5 presents the decomposition for each subsector’s labour share. Additionally, the table
presents an extra row (“combined subsectors”) with the decomposition of an aggregate series of
λobs, computed from a weighted average of subsectors’ λobs, using value added as weights. For
comparison, another row is added wth the results for the whole manufacturing sector presented
in the main text. Finally, to give a sense of the importance of different subsectors, the table
includes an extra column with the 2014’s share of value added of each subsector with respect to all
manufacturing.
The overall picture is the same as in our results for the whole manufacturing sector, namely that
firm heterogeneity has not been a major driver of the labour share. This is true both for subsectors
individually and for their combination. The latter decomposition is also quite similar to the results
for manufacturing as a whole. Still, some disparity is observed in
∑
across subsectors, both in
terms of direction of change and magnitude, with most of the effect of heterogeneity going against
the observed change in the labour share (just like in the main results). Notice also that the labour
share went up in some subsectors, albeit fell in most of them.
41The depreciation rate is assumed to be 4.58%, the average for the 1998-2014 period, according to Office for
National Statistics data for the UK.
42In particular, a meaningful result is one where ρ is not greater than 1 (for which the elasticity of substitution is
properly defined), and where α is between 0 and 1 (otherwise, one factor of production would have negative marginal
product).
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Table A5: Contribution to change in subsector labour share (λobs), 1998-2014
Subsector λobs λHOM
∑
Interaction Subsector’s share of
value added (2014)
13 (Manufacture of textiles) -9.19% -9.56% 0.40% -0.04% 1.4%
14 (Manufacture of wearing apparel) -25.66% -34.00% 12.65% -4.30% 0.5%
16 (Manufacture of wood and products
of wood and cork, excl. furniture)
-10.28% -15.61% 6.32% -0.99% 1.7%
17 (Manufacture of paper and paper
products)
-8.89% -9.56% 0.74% -0.07% 2.3%
18 (Printing and reproduction of recor-
ded media)
-6.15% -7.06% 0.98% -0.07% 3.1%
23 (Manufacture of other non-metallic
mineral products)
-10.45% -7.08% -3.63% 0.26% 3.5%
25 (Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, excl. machinery and equip.)
-12.70% -14.66% 2.29% -0.34% 10.8%
26 (Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products)
6.38% 12.49% -5.42% -0.68% 5.3%
27 (Manufacture of electrical equip-
ment)
1.78% 8.73% -6.39% -0.56% 3.0%
28 (Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.)
-6.60% -7.54% 1.02% -0.08% 8.1%
29 (Manufacture of motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-trailers)
-19.77% -21.55% 2.27% -0.49% 10.2%
30 (Manufacture of other transport
equipment)
-11.46% -19.66% 10.21% -2.01% 6.4%
33 (Repair and installation of ma-
chinery and equipment)
10.25% 10.90% -0.59% -0.06% 3.9%
Combined subsectors -8.75% -9.39% 0.69% -0.05% 60.4%
All manufacturing -7.18% -8.98% 1.98% -0.18% 100%
Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: UK manufacturing firms with 10 employees or more. Subsectors represent 2 digit (division) SIC07
codes. Subsectors which estimates were spurious and thus omitted are 10 (“manufacture of food products”), 11
(“manufacture of beverages”), 12 (“manufacture of tobacco products”), 15 (“manufacture of leather and related
products”), 20 (“manufacture of chemicals and chemical products”), 21 (“manufacture of pharmaceutical
products”), 22 (“manufacture of rubber and plastic products”), 31 (“manufacture of furniture”) and 32 (“other
manufacturing”). Subsector 19 (“manufacture of coke and refined petroleum”) is omitted from main analysis
and thus also omitted here.
Finally, Table A6 shows the decomposition of λHOM across subsectors (similar to Table 3).43 In
line with results at the aggregate level, the key driver of the homogeneous labour share (and thus
of the subsector labour shares) is the disconnect between pay and productivity. In most subsectors,
productivity grew faster than real wages. Exceptions are subsectors 26 and 27 (“manufacture of
computer, electronic and optical products” and “manufacture of electrical equipment”, respectively),
where wages grew faster than productivity, and subsector 33 (“repair and installation of machinery
and equipment”), where both productivity and wages shrank over the period, the former more than
the latter.
Regarding market power, there are differences with respect to the results for the whole sector.
43Unlike in Table A5, no decomposition is shown for the ”combined” subsectors because this requires an estimate
of ρ, which was only estimated at the subsector levels.
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Whereas in the latter both product and market power had an equally minor role in λHOM , in most
subsectors the contribution of labour market power is significantly greater than that of product
market power. In fact, in some subsectors the change in labour market power is high enough to make
a significant difference to the subsector’s λHOM . For instance, in subsector 26, the pay-productivity
disconnect changed very little over the period; it is χ¯L which defines the bulk of the change. In
particular, the labour market power of firms in this subsector fell importantly over the period.44
Overall, subsector and industry-wide results differ only where the latter masks heterogeneity in
the former. As Table A6 reveals, this is particularly relevant for labour market power, which
contribution contains both large positive and negative values. Conversely, variables like TFP and
real wages have the same sign in all subsectors but one (subsector 33).
Table A6: Contribution to changes in subsectoral λHOM , 1998-2014
Subsector λHOM A¯ w¯/p¯ χ¯Y χ¯L τ¯ Interaction
13 -9.56% -32.94% 24.37% -2.20% -3.36% 1.33% 3.22%
14 -34.00% -136.42% 64.55% -3.87% 26.76% -34.73% 49.71%
16 -15.61% -22.44% 7.68% -2.21% 4.85% -6.97% 3.49%
17 -9.56% -28.03% 13.97% -0.62% 1.29% -5.03% 8.86%
18 -7.06% -21.37% 11.88% -1.66% -3.24% 8.30% -0.97%
23 -7.08% -13.25% 9.68% 0.84% -0.12% -5.19% 0.96%
25 -14.66% -20.15% 9.05% -3.83% -6.83% 2.98% 4.11%
26 12.49% -79.48% 81.38% -1.49% 10.61% -6.51% 7.97%
27 8.73% -7.90% 17.46% 0.18% 10.29% -11.64% 0.35%
28 -7.54 % -34.12% 23.59% -0.89% 1.48% -3.43% 5.84%
29 -21.55% -87.24% 55.68% 0.41% -15.14% 2.49% 22.25%
30 -19.66% -14.08% 0.52% -1.76% -0.63% -7.58% 3.87%
33 10.90% 4.94% -0.39% 0.08% 17.46% -15.09% 3.90%
Note: the extreme behaviour of subsector 14 is due to a significant reduction in the sample
size available, from 340 firms in 1998 to 56 firms in 2018.
Source: our calculation based on ARD data.
Sample: see Table A5.
44Recall from the growth accounting decomposition that gχ¯L is multiplied by −
(
1
1−ρ
)
. The estimated ρ for this
subsector is negative, which, combined with a fall in χ¯L (i.e. a fall in firms’ labour market power) yields the positive
contribution of this variable to λHOM , as Table A6 shows.
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